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The Supreme Court has recently decided to hear argument in the largest
private-employer civil rights case in American history, Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.' This historic case began over a decade ago when former and
current female employees brought a class action against Wal-Mart, one of
the largest companies in the world, on behalf of approximately 1.5 million
women, alleging gender discrimination in pay and promotions. The class
contends that women are disproportionately denied promotions and are un-
derpaid for comparable work in comparison to their male colleagues because
of a corporate culture that gives store managers undue discretion when mak-
ing employment decisions. The lawsuit is premised on the theory that exces-
sive subjectivity enabled improper gender stereotyping to permeate the
company, resulting in a pattern or practice of gender discrimination, in viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Like many employees who challenge companywide employment dis-
crimination, the plaintiffs in Dukes brought their case as a class action pursu-
ant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Rule 23(b)(2)
* Associate Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. I
am indebted to many for their support of this project. I am particularly grateful to the follow-
ing people for providing me with invaluable insights and feedback in record time: Professor
Kathryn Kelly, Professor A. Benjamin Spencer, Professor Robert G. Bone, Professor Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch, and Cyrus Mehri, Esq. A special thanks goes the following people for their
excellent research assistance: Associate Director Elizabeth A. Edinger, Research Fellow Alfred
Dumetz, and Research Assistants Christina K. Setlow and Grant Mulkey. Thank you to Dean
and Professor Veryl V. Miles and the Columbus School of Law for their generous funding of
this project. Much appreciation goes to the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) for
selecting my topic as a "hot topic" and permitting me to present my work on a panel at the
2011 annual conference. For purposes of full disclosure, over eight years ago, I briefly served
as counsel for plaintiffs in Dukes v. Wal-Mart as an associate at Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld &
Toll, P.L.L.C. This article is dedicated to my mother, whose inspiration, support and unwaver-
ing faith in me has enabled me to engage in this labor of love.
'603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 795 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277).
2 In order for a case to be certified as a class action, all of the Rule 23(a) provisions and
any one of the Rule 23(b) provisions must be met. Rule 23(a) is satisfied when (1) the class is
so numerous that joinder would be impracticable; (2) the class shares common questions of
law or fact; (3) the representative parties are typical of the class; and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately represent the class. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23(b)(1)
allows a class action when there is a risk that in the absence of a class action, (a) the party
opposing the class will be subject to inconsistent obligations or (b) as a practical matter, piece-
meal litigation of individual class members will impair the interests of other class members
who are not parties to the individual lawsuits, as is the case in a trust fund. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b). Rule 23(b)(2) permits a class action when there is class-wide conduct that makes final
injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief appropriate for the whole class. See id. Rule
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does not require that class members be given notice and an opportunity to
exclude themselves from the case. This mandatory class action is allowed,
however, because of the cohesiveness and homogeneity of the class. Rule
23(b)(2) permits a case to be certified as a class action when "the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply gener-
ally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole."' Plaintiffs sought an
injunction to enjoin Wal-Mart's alleged discriminatory practices and a decla-
ration that the company's conduct was illegal.
In addition, plaintiffs sought two types of monetary relief: back pay and
punitive damages. Back pay includes lost wages and salary, benefits, and
other monetary benefits lost due to discrimination. 4 Back pay is designed to
put a victim of discrimination back in his or her rightful place, to make the
person whole.' Punitive damages are awarded to plaintiffs when a defendant
has carried out discrimination with "malice or reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."6 Punitive damages
are meant to punish a defendant and deter him or her from future miscon-
duct. The plaintiffs chose not to pursue compensatory damages, which com-
pensate individuals for "emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses"7 result-
ing from discrimination.
The district court held that the plaintiffs met Rule 23(b)(2)'s criteria,
along with Rule 23(a)'s numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
requirements.' After several appeals, class certification was largely upheld
by the Ninth Circuit in a sharply divided en banc opinion. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's Rule 23(b)(2) certification of a class of current
employees with respect to their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
and back pay.9 The Ninth Circuit reversed as to plaintiffs' punitive damages
claims, holding that the district court abused its discretion in certifying a
Rule 23(b)(2) class that included such damages without first determining
23(b)(3) authorizes a class action when common questions predominate over individual ones
and a class action is a superior method for resolving the dispute. See id.
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
4 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
§ 32.VIII.C.1., at 2199, §40.II.B.l.a., at 2759-71 (4th ed. 2007).
1 Although less common than back pay, front pay is also awarded to put victims of dis-
crimination back in their "rightful place." Front pay compensates a plaintiff for any antici-
pated future loss because the plaintiff cannot be reinstated, immediately hired, or promoted.
1-2 EMPLOYEE RIGirrs LrrlGATION: PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 2.10(2)(b), at 2-218.60 (2010).
642 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2006) (enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991)).
' 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3) (2006) (enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991)).
8 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
9 While the Ninth Circuit held that former employees (as of the date the complaint was
filed) lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief in the (b)(2) class-thereby re-
ducing the class to approximately 500,000 women-it remanded to the district court the ques-
tion of whether a class of former employees could comprise a separate Rule 23(b)(3) class for
back pay and punitive damages. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 623-24 (9th
Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 795 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277).
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whether the case would qualify as predominantly one for injunctive or de-
claratory relief. Thus, on this issue, the Ninth Circuit remanded so the dis-
trict judge could determine whether certification was appropriate for the
punitive damages claims under Rule 23(b)(2) or under Rule 23(b)(3).10
This ruling set the stage for review by the nation's highest court because
of the ruling's potential impact on class actions all over the country, involv-
ing areas as varied as employment discrimination, securities, antitrust, and
products liability. The potential impact of the case stems not so much from
the size of the Dukes class as from how the case will influence the very
survival of certain types of class actions. At issue is whether it will become
more difficult for plaintiffs who seek monetary relief for systemic miscon-
duct to meet the class action criteria. This is important because for many
employees and others, a class action is their only meaningful access to the
courts. Moreover, class actions are important to the civil justice system be-
cause of the substantial time and cost savings they provide the courts and
parties. The Dukes case has the potential to redefine the terms on which this
critical procedural device is available.
While the case involves numerous complex procedural and substantive
issues, this article addresses the discrete issue presented before the Court of
"[w]hether claims for monetary relief can be certified under Rule
23(b)(2)-which by its terms is limited to injunctive or corresponding de-
claratory relief-and, if so, under what circumstances."" The answer to this
question will have significant implications for the future of class action law.
As described above, there are different types of monetary relief. Some
monetary relief is equitable, such as back pay. Other monetary relief is le-
gal, such as compensatory and punitive damages. Such distinctions matter
because the courts have treated petitions for Rule 23(b)(2) certification dif-
ferently depending on the type of monetary relief being sought. Most impor-
tantly, courts have historically permitted back pay in Rule 23(b)(2) class
actions because of its equitable nature and uniform relief, which makes back
pay compatible with the Rule's premise that the class be cohesive and rela-
tively homogeneous.
In contrast, the courts have treated requests for monetary damages
(compensatory and punitive) very differently. The courts permit (b)(2) certi-
fication only when damages do not predominate over the injunctive or de-
claratory relief sought. This is because monetary damages may not lend
themselves to common proof, but instead require individualized assess-
ments.12 While the courts disagree over how predominance should be deter-
mined, they uniformly apply a predominance test to claims involving
'0 Rule 23(b)(3) provides for certification when common issues predominate over individ-
ual ones and a class action is superior to other mechanisms for resolving a dispute. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
" Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 10-277 (Aug.
25, 2010), 2002 WL 3355820 at *i.
12 See Dukes, 603 F.3d at 622.
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monetary damages to ensure that the class remains primarily focused on
group-wide injury and relief.
This article examines the discrete yet critical question presented in the
Dukes litigation of whether any monetary relief is permitted in a (b)(2) class,
and if so, under what circumstances. Part I analyzes the first part of this
inquiry and Part II addresses the latter. More specifically, Part I applies the
two primary modes of statutory construction-textualism and intentional-
ism-to determine how the Supreme Court should interpret Rule 23(b)(2)'s
silence on the issue of whether monetary relief is permitted. Under either
mode of construction, the Supreme Court should consult the Advisory Com-
mittee's notes to clarify an ambiguous text or to avoid an absurd result in-
volving an unambiguous text. Moreover, because the Advisory Committee
is tasked with drafting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the Supreme
Court, subject to Congress's approval, the Court should defer to the Commit-
tee's notes when discerning the Rule's meaning. The notes' unique develop-
ment and role distinguish them from statutory legislative history and its
interpretive drawbacks.
The Advisory Committee notes state that so long as the appropriate
final relief does not relate "exclusively or predominantly to money dam-
ages," class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is proper." This language
makes clear that the drafters did not intend to ban all forms of monetary
relief, but only a small subset-exclusive or predominant damages. Thus,
the answer to the threshold question of whether any monetary relief is al-
lowed by the Rule's text is yes. Wal-Mart's interpretation to the contrary
goes against well-settled law, including decisions by all of the courts of ap-
peals that have addressed the issue. Part I concludes that regardless of
which interpretive mode of statutory construction is used, the Advisory
Committee's intentl 4 -to permit monetary relief so long as it is not exclusive
or predominant-should govern.
Part II examines under what circumstances monetary relief is justified
under Rule 23(b)(2). This part concludes that back pay" and monetary dam-
ages that are not exclusive or predominant justify (b)(2) certification. Be-
cause of its equitable nature and uniform relief, back pay has regularly been
permitted in Rule 23(b)(2) employment discrimination class actions brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Monetary damages (com-
pensatory and punitive) are also allowed so long as they are not the exclu-
sive or predominant relief sought under (b)(2). Predominance ensures that
the class remains sufficiently cohesive to provide due process, while suffi-
ciently flexible to provide the efficiency of aggregate litigation. The Rule's
" FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note.
1 Because of the unique rulemaking process set forth in the Rules Enabling Act, congres-
sional intent is expressed through the Advisory Committee. See discussion below at Part
I.B.L.
" For similar reasons, front pay and other typical equitable forms of monetary relief
should be permitted. See, e.g., Patterson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.
1976) (awarding front pay as part of Title VII's "make whole" remedy).
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drafters and all of the courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have
identified predominance as the linchpin of certification of claims involving
damages. Thus, Wal-Mart's contention that there are no circumstances under
which monetary relief is justified under (b)(2) is at odds with well-estab-
lished jurisprudence in this area.
Although there is no disagreement over the propriety of using a pre-
dominance test, the courts of appeals disagree over how predominance
should be defined. Part II describes the three major predominance ap-
proaches: the Fifth Circuit's incidental test established in Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp.,'" the Second Circuit's ad hoc balancing test established in
Robinson v. Metro-North Railroad Co.," and the Ninth Circuit's objective
effects test established in Dukes v. Wal-Mart.
Part III critiques each of the three tests used by the circuit courts for
determining whether monetary damages predominate under Rule 23(b)(2),
including the new test the Ninth Circuit crafted and applied in Dukes. Rely-
ing on principles such as judicial discretion, judicial economy, due process,
and civil rights enforcement, this part conducts a comparative analysis of the
three different approaches. This part concludes that the youngest predomi-
nance test, formulated in Dukes-which balances pragmatism and efficiency
with due process and civil rights interests-may offer the most promising
insights.
I. MONETARY RELIEF IS PERMITTED BY THE TEXT OF RULE 23(B)(2)
The threshold question to address is whether, given the text of the Rule,
any monetary relief is appropriate in a Rule 23(b)(2) class." In other words,
the question is whether monetary relief is permitted when the Rule requires
that "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that
apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole."" Wal-Mart
argues that the Rule on its face proscribes monetary relief. The text of Rule
23(b)(2), however, neither explicitly prohibits nor permits monetary relief.
The Rule makes clear that final injunctive or corresponding declaratory re-
lief is permissible given generally applicable conduct that impacts the class
as a whole. Rule 23(b)(2) is silent, however, as to whether monetary relief is
permissible under such circumstances.
16 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
"7 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).
" Wal-Mart's framing of the question as "[w]hether claims for monetary relief can be
certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)-which by its terms is limited to
injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief' presumes that the text itself limits the type of
relief permitted-the very question at issue. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dukes, 603 F.3d
571 (No. 10-277), 2002 WL 3355820. Despite this semantic imprecision, the Supreme Court
granted review on the question as framed. Dukes, 603 F.3d 571, cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 795
(Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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How should the Supreme Court interpret the Rule's silence on this mat-
ter? On the one hand, silence may be a deliberate prohibition of any type of
relief not explicitly mentioned. If the rule makers wanted to allow monetary
relief under the Rule, they could have easily included it in the text. But
nothing in the text explicitly permits monetary relief. On the other hand,
silence may be a mere omission. Nothing in the text explicitly prohibits
monetary relief. Providing that injunctive or corresponding declaratory re-
lief is appropriate when a party acts on a class-wide basis does not foreclose
the possibility that monetary relief may also be sought,2 0 especially when the
latter is ancillary to the former. Given that the Supreme Court has at differ-
ent times interpreted silence to allow for and foreclose a particular remedy,2 1
Rule 23(b)(2) is open to either interpretation.
This part makes procedural and substantive arguments. Procedurally,
the Court should consult the Advisory Committee's notes to discern whether
Rule 23(b)(2) allows monetary relief and should defer to them because of
their unique development and function. Substantively, the Advisory Com-
mittee's notes allow monetary relief for Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, includ-
ing those challenging contemporary systemic discrimination. A contrary
interpretation of the notes-put forth by Wal-Mart-would go against well-
settled law.
A. Courts Should Consult the Advisory Committee Notes to
Determine Rule 23(b)(2)'s Meaning
Although the starting point for interpreting the meaning of a rule is its
text, when the text is ambiguous, courts should consult legislative history to
discern the drafters' intent. Moreover, even when a text is unambiguous,
courts should rely on legislative history to confirm the rule's plain meaning
or to avoid an absurd result. The ambiguity of Rule 23(b)(2), underscored
by the Rule's silence on the availability of monetary relief, justifies the Su-
preme Court's reliance on the Rule's drafters-the Advisory Committee-to
clarify the Rule's meaning. Alternatively, even if the Rule is unambiguous,
the Court is empowered to consult the Advisory Committee notes to confirm
the Rule's meaning or to avoid an illogical outcome.
A court's decision whether to use legislative history to discern a stat-
ute's meaning depends not only on whether the text is ambiguous, but also
20 See Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that
the language authorizes a class action in these circumstances, not that it limits the remedy
available).
21 See Natasha Dasani, Note, Class Actions and the Interpretation of Monetary Damages
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 183-85 (2006);
see generally Daniel L. Rotenberg, Congressional Silence in the Supreme Court, 47 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 375 (1992).
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on which mode of statutory interpretation the court uses. 22 While the Court
has traditionally relied on the original intent and purpose of a statute when
construing its meaning,23 in recent history, the Court has splintered between
two approaches-textualism and intentionalism. 24 Textualism, often associ-
ated with Justice Antonin Scalia, involves examination of the text and struc-
ture of a statute to discern its plain meaning.25 When a text is ambiguous,
textualists consult legislative history. But when a text is unambiguous, they
rely only on the text and the statute as a whole to determine the statute's
meaning. On the other hand, intentionalism, often associated with Justice
Stephen Breyer, focuses on the legislative intent and purpose of a statute and
involves examination of extrinsic sources. 26 Whether a statute is ambiguous
or unambiguous, intentionalists consult legislative history. The Court ap-
plies these interpretative modes not only to statutes, but also to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 27 Although the long-standing tension between
these two general interpretive approaches is beyond the scope of this article,
the tension raises important implications for the Dukes case and for the sur-
vival of a myriad of class actions involving monetary relief.
The decision whether to consult legislative history generally hinges
upon whether the statutory text is ambiguous, because under either theory of
statutory construction, ambiguity enables courts to use extrinsic sources for
analysis.28 However, because textualists are less likely to find a text ambigu-
ous,2 9 textualism poses a greater challenge than intentionalism for plaintiffs
contending that Rule 23(b)(2) permits monetary relief. 0 Given the Court's
increasing propensity to rely on textualism when discerning a rule's mean-
22 For an examination of the ways Rule 23(b)(2)'s silence on the availability of monetary
relief can be interpreted, depending on the mode of statutory construction used by the Supreme
Court, see Dasani, supra note 21, at 169.
23 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Texualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624, 626 (1990).
24 They are also referred to as a "plain-meaning" approach and "purposivism,"
respectively.
25 See Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGs L.J., 1039, 1074 (1993); see also ANToNIN SCALIA, A MAT
TER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Dasani,
supra note 21, at 177-78.
26 See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1152 (2002); see also Dasani, supra note 21, at
180-81; see, e.g., Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004) (Stevens,
J., with Breyer, J., concurring) ("it is always appropriate to consider all evidence of Congress'
true intent when interpreting its work product"); see generally, STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85-101 (Vintage Books, 2005).
27 Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1998) ("[T]he Court routinely uses principles of statutory interpretation
in construing the rules.").
28 Dasani, supra note 21, at 183-84.
29 Moore, supra note 25, at 1074 ("Plain meaning adherents often find that statutory lan-
guage is clear, even when others argue that the same statutory language is ambiguous.").
30 See Dasani, supra note 21, at 198-99.
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ing,31 plaintiffs are vulnerable to having Rule 23(b)(2) limited to injunctive
and declaratory relief. Although this would suggest that a prohibition on
monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(2) is a foregone conclusion, two critical
points suggest that under either theory, the Court should consult the Advi-
sory Committee's notes, which indicate that monetary relief is permitted.
First, Rule 23(b)(2) is ambiguous, and therefore, under either interpre-
tive approach, the Court should consider the underlying legislative history,32
as set forth in the Advisory Committee's notes. As Justice John Paul Stevens
observed, "'ambiguity' is a term that may have different meanings for dif-
ferent judges" and is "apparently in the eye of the beholder."33 A textualist
might argue that there is nothing ambiguous about Rule 23(b)(2)'s language
because on its face, it plainly does not include monetary relief. If the Court
interpreted silence to mean that such relief is allowed, any party could im-
port whatever terms were absent from the Rule on the grounds that the Rule
did not explicitly forbid them. The text would be meaningless and the Rule
would be limitless.
However, the better argument is that Rule 23(b)(2)'s language is ambig-
uous. In Supreme Court practice, a statute is ambiguous when its text may
reasonably be given two or more meanings. 34 Here, it is clear that Rule
23(b)(2) is ambiguous given its susceptibility to multiple interpretations,
ranging from the view that the Rule plainly does not include monetary relief
to the view that the Rule plainly does not exclude monetary relief. Indeed,
all of the federal courts of appeals that have considered the issue have con-
cluded that monetary relief is allowed. This demonstrates that Rule
23(b)(2)'s text is at least ambiguous as to whether a blanket prohibition ex-
ists against monetary relief. From the Fifth Circuit's most restrictive class
certification standard in Allison, to the Second Circuit's most permissive one
in Robinson, the circuit courts have not interpreted Rule 23(b)(2)'s silence to
foreclose monetary relief." Had the Rule's text been so clear, there would
have been no need for the federal appellate courts to seek counsel from the
Advisory Committee.
1' Eskridge, supra note 23, at 625, 656; Moore, supra note 25, at 1073 ("[T]he Court has
increasingly relied on a 'plain meaning' analysis to dispose of difficult questions involving the
interpretation and application of various Federal Rules.").
32 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) ("Extrinsic
materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on
the enacting Legislature's understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.") (emphasis added);
Eskridge, supra note 23, at 658 ("Probably all of the Justices are willing to consult relevant
legislative history if the statutory text is genuinely ambiguous or open-textured.").
3 Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34 Although there is no one way of determining ambiguity and the Supreme Court has
interpreted statutory silence in a variety of ways, ambiguity is a natural consequence of silence
because "silence does not define itself." Rotenberg, supra note 21 at 375; see also Crosby v.
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) ("the silence of Congress is ambigu-
ous"); Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 449 (1996) (identifying legislative silence as
"ambiguous").
3 See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 411 (5th Cir. 1998) (relying on
Advisory Committee's note); Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147,
163-64 (2d Cir. 2001) (relying on Advisory Committee's note).
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Moreover, if the Court interprets silence to mean that class-wide mone-
tary relief is forbidden, a party could move to prohibit anything a rule did
not explicitly provide. This approach would be unworkable for the drafters,
who would have to anticipate and enumerate every possible circumstance
permitted by the Rules. Concise rules would be impossible. In sum, given
Rule 23(b)(2)'s ambiguity, the Court should consult legislative history to
determine the intent of the drafters-the Advisory Committee.36
Second, even if the Court finds Rule 23(b)(2) unambiguous, the Court
may consult legislative history under a textualist approach "to avoid absurd-
ities" 37 or under a "soft plain-meaning" approach to "confirm or rebut the
plain meaning of a clear statute."38 Interpreting Rule 23(b)(2)'s text as fore-
closing all monetary relief would arguably "produce an absurd result." 9
Absurdity is not limited to a scrivener's error but includes interpretations that
Congress could not conceivably have intended." Here, the Advisory Com-
mittee 4 1 could not conceivably have intended to prohibit all monetary relief
under Rule 23(b)(2) because the Committee explicitly contemplates the pres-
ence of monetary damages in a (b)(2) class. The Committee's note accompa-
nying (b)(2) states: "The subdivision does not extend to cases in which the
appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money dam-
ages." 42 This language makes clear that Rule 23(b)(2) does not ban all
forms of monetary relief, but instead permits such relief (in the form of
damages), so long as it is not exclusive or predominant. This logic has not
escaped the federal courts of appeals, all of which have relied on this lan-
guage to justify monetary relief in (b)(2) classes.43
The Dukes case is similar to other Supreme Court cases, in which the
justices relied on legislative history to avoid an absurd result. For example,
in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., the Court looked beyond the plain
meaning of Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence on the grounds that
"[n]o matter how plain the text of the Rule may be, we cannot accept an
6 Dasani, supra note 21, at 194.
* Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Moore, supra note 25, at 1074-75 (noting Justice Scalia's receptivity to use of extrinsic
sources when text's literal interpretation would "produce an absurd result"); Eskridge, supra
note 23 (discussing absurdity exception); SCALIA, supra note 25 at 20-21.
3 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 658.
3 Moore, supra note 25, at 1074-75 (noting Justice Scalia's receptivity to use of extrinsic
sources when text's literal interpretation would "produce an absurd result").
40 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 658.
The Advisory Committee notes and text of proposed Rule amendments are forwarded to
the Judicial Conference, then to the Supreme Court, and then to Congress. Consequently,
congressional intent is evidenced by the Advisory Committee notes.
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
43 See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 124 (1994) (per curiam) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("lower courts have consistently held that the presence of monetary damages
claims does not preclude class certification under . . . [R]ule 23(b)(2)"); see, e.g., Dukes v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 615-16 (9th Cir. 2010) ("An interpretation of Rule
23(b)(2) that prevented any claim for monetary relief would render this advisory committee
requirement redundant or irrelevant."); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 411
(5th Cir. 1998).
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interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an
adversary's testimony that it grants to a civil defendant."" Because the ma-
jority found it "unfathomable" that the Rule would subject a civil plaintiff to
such risk,45 the court concluded the Rule "can't mean what it says." 46 Simi-
larly, to the extent that Rule 23(b)(2) does not plainly provide for monetary
relief, the Court should not accept an interpretation that would deny a plain-
tiff the right to pursue make-whole relief under Title VII. The Rule "can't
mean what it says" when Rule 23(b)(2)'s drafters explicitly contemplated the
availability of monetary relief and designed the Rule to enable plaintiffs to
pursue make-whole relief under Title VII.
Some may argue that characterizing a prohibition of Rule 23(b)(2)
monetary relief as "absurd" is going too far. The Court has the prerogative
to disagree with the courts of appeals and is not bound by the Advisory
Committee, even if they have all concluded that the Rule permits monetary
relief. As Justice Stevens noted, however, in another case: "[W]e cannot
escape [an] unambiguous statutory command by proclaiming that it would
produce an absurd result. We can, however, escape by using common
sense." 4 7 If not absurd, it certainly defies common sense that the Rule's
drafters would impose a limitation on monetary relief they intended to com-
pletely ban under the Rule.
In the event that the Court finds a monetary ban does not rise to the
level of an "absurdity," the Court may rely on legislative history to double-
check the meaning of the Rule. Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr. describes
a "soft plain-meaning rule"-a hybrid between textualism and intentional-
ism-when the Court uses legislative history as a check on the plain mean-
ing of the statute.48 As discussed supra, using the Advisory Committee
notes to check Rule 23(b)(2)'s plain meaning only illustrates that monetary
relief is permissible-a conclusion shared by every single court of appeals to
have decided the issue.
Therefore, even a textualist approach or soft plain-meaning approach
supports relying on the Advisory Committee's guidance. Consequently, re-
" Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 (1989).
45 Id. at 510-11.
" Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("We are confronted here with a statute which, if
interpreted literally, produces an absurd ... result."). Similarly, in Harbison v. Bell, the Court
looked beyond the plain text of 18 U.S.C. § 3599-which provides for the appointment of
federal counsel in state clemency proceedings-to discern whether a state inmate faced with
imminent execution would have to procure new counsel to file a stay because his federal
counsel was not authorized to represent him. 129 S.Ct. 1481 (2009). Where the plain lan-
guage of the statute failed to resolve this question, the various justices disagreed over whether
inserting the word "federal" into the statute would produce absurd results and be inconsistent
with the statute's basic purpose. Id. at 1487-89, 1487 n.6, 1491-92, 1498.
47 Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
48 See Eskridge, supra note 23, at 658; see, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
431-33, 433 n.12 (1987) (consulting legislative history to determine if it expressly contra-
dicted statutory language).
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gardless of the statutory interpretive mode employed, Rule 23(b)(2), by its
terms, does not proscribe monetary relief.
B. The Advisory Committee Notes Clarify That Rule 23(b)(2)
Permits Some Monetary Relief
The Advisory Committee notes accompanying Rule 23(b)(2) confirms
the availability of monetary relief under the provision. The notes explain:
This subdivision is intended to reach situations where a party
has taken action or refused to take action with respect to a class,
and final relief of an injunctive nature or of a corresponding de-
claratory nature, settling the legality of the behavior with respect
to the class as a whole, is appropriate. . . . The subdivision does
not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates
exclusively or predominantly to money damages. 49
The crux of a (b)(2) class action is that because conduct has been di-
rected toward a group of people, group-wide relief, such as an injunction or
declaration, is appropriate. This does not mean, however, that the only relief
available to a (b)(2) class is group wide. Relief that may not address the
class as whole, such as monetary damages, is contemplated by the notes. By
referencing a limitation on monetary damages, the Committee explicitly rec-
ognizes the availability of such relief. The next question is what signifi-
cance the Supreme Court should give to the Committee's notes.
1. The Advisory Committee Should Be Given Considerable
Deference
When consulting legislative history to decipher a statute's meaning, the
Court must determine what deference to give the drafters. The late Professor
Charles Alan Wright and Professor Arthur R. Miller acknowledge the central
role the Advisory Committee notes play in contextualizing the Federal Rules
and fleshing out their meaning for the courts:
In interpreting the federal rules, the Advisory Committee Notes
are a very important source of information and direction and
should be given considerable weight. Although these Notes are
not conclusive, they provide something akin to a "legislative his-
tory" of the rules, and carry, in addition, the great prestige that the
individual members of the successive Advisory Committees, and
the Committees themselves, have enjoyed as authorities on
procedure. 0
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
504 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1029 (3d ed. 2004).
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Paralleling the familiar divide between textualists and intentionalists,
there is a similar divide between critics and supporters of legislative history.
Legislative history comes under fire as an interpretive tool because it is ar-
guably "murky, ambiguous, and contradictory;"' unreliable and subject to
manipulation; 52 and exempt from the formal legislative process.
The Advisory Committee notes, however, are not susceptible to the
same criticisms as traditional legislative history. Significant distinctions be-
tween the Advisory Committee notes and congressional legislative history
justify the Court's reliance on the former when discerning the drafters' intent.
The unique process involved in creating the Federal Rules and the distinct
nature of the notes themselves make reliance on them a more productive
enterprise. More specifically, unlike other extrinsic sources that accompany
federal statutes, the Advisory Committee notes are a single source, designed
to provide official guidance for rule interpretation, drafted by the same au-
thors of the rule, subject to review from inception to final enactment, and
formally approved of by the United States Judicial Conference and the Su-
preme Court itself before transmission to Congress.5 4 Moreover, given the
active role that judges play in drafting and commenting on the rules and
accompanying notes, the review by the Judicial Conference, and the ultimate
promulgation by the Supreme Court (subject only to congressional override),
there is not the same concern over the balance of power between the judicial
and legislative branches when courts interpret the Advisory Committee notes
as there is when they interpret traditional legislative history. 5 In sum, these
safeguards make the Advisory Committee notes a reliable and authoritative
source for discerning the rule makers' intent. 6
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has not recognized the Advisory Com-
mittee notes as authoritative;" it is the Court's job to dispositively interpret
51 Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).
52 Id.
" See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2815 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to reliance on legis-
lative history); SCALIA, supra note 25, at 29-37.
54 See Dasani, supra note 21, at 190-91, 194-95 (describing distinctions between Advi-
sory Committee notes and legislative history and arguing why notes should be used to interpret
Federal Rules); Struve, supra note 26, at 1112-14, 1152, 1158-61.
55 See Dasani, supra note 21, at 190-91.
56 The fact that the Advisory Committee is tasked with drafting the rules for the Court-
subject to its and Congress's approval-further supports the Court's reliance on the Commit-
tee's notes. Consequently, some commentators have argued that the federal courts should en-
joy a more expansive role and power when interpreting the Federal Rules. See Joseph P.
Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme Court's Role as Interpreter
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 720, 720 (1988); Moore,
supra note 25, at 1093.
5 Struve, supra note 26, at 1167; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 50, at § 1029, § 1029
n.21 ("Notes are not conclusive"); FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note ("The notes
are not part of the rules, and the Supreme Court has not approved or otherwise assumed re-
sponsibility for them"); see, e.g., Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2498-99
(2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Advisory Committee's notes are useful like other scholarship,
but the Committee's intentions do not impact the Rule's meaning, only text does).
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the Rules.58 In practice, however, when deciphering the Federal Rules, the
Supreme Court has regularly relied on the Advisory Committee notes and
accorded them significant weight." For example, in the seminal class-certi-
fication cases, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation and Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windsor, the Court repeatedly resorted to the Advisory Committee notes
to discern the drafters' intent and Rule 23's meaning.60 Consequently, the
courts of appeals have simply assumed the notes' applicability when inter-
preting Rule 23(b)(2). 6'
When originally drafting the Federal Rules, the Advisory Committee
itself noted that its notes were not controlling. 62 The initial notes to Rule
23(b)(2) in 1966 were terse additions to the Rules, without binding effect.
However, procedural experts have noted that over time the Advisory Com-
mittee has written "more extensive and discursive" notes when explaining
rule changes, and has even written notes "to guide judicial construction of a
rule along proper lines" in the absence of a rule change, in "apparent ...
recogni[tion of] the authoritative character that the Notes have assumed.' 63
As of 1988, the Advisory Committee is required to draft notes to accompany
any proposed rule amendment, and "these Notes are drafted, redrafted, voted
on, and approved in much the same manner as the text of the proposed
Rules."M In sum, because of the distinctive process involved in creating the
Rules and the qualities of the notes themselves, the Court should defer to the
Advisory Committee's clarification that Rule 23(b)(2) permits monetary
relief.
" Moore, supra note 25, at 1094 ("the dispositive interpretive consideration should be ...
[the] Court's own understanding of the Rule," rather than the Advisory Committee notes).
59 Struve, supra note 26, at 1161 (describing the "Court's frequent resort to Notes in con-
struing the Rules" and noting over the years that "despite the Court's internal debate over
textualism in statutory interpretation-all the Justices have made liberal use of the Notes"); id.
at 1162-63 (2002) (noting that "despite his predominantly textualist approach to statutory
interpretation-Justice Scalia frequently joins, or even writes, opinions that rely upon Advi-
sory Committee Notes"); id. at 1663-65, 1165 n. 273 (citing cases). But see Tome v. United
States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("I have previously acquiesced in, . . . and indeed myself engaged in, . . . similar use of the
Advisory Committee Notes" and concluded "that is wrong") (citations omitted). See gener-
ally Commentary, Use of Notes and Statements of Advisory Committee in Construction of
Rules, 2 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 632 (1940); Commentary, Use of Notes and Statements of
Advisory Committee in Construction of Rules, 3 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 663 (1940).
' See e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833-35, 835 n.15, 838, 841-45, 844
n.20-21, 864 (2009) (citing Advisory Committee's notes extensively in interpretation of Rule
23(b)(1) in personal injury asbestos case); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
614-17 (1997) (citing Advisory Committee's notes throughout in describing characteristics of
class actions under Rule 23's provisions in personal injury asbestos case).
6 See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162 (2d Cir.
2001); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 411 (5th Cir. 1998).
6 FED. R. Crv. P. 23 advisory committee's note (the notes "have no official sanction, and
can have no controlling weight with the courts, when applying the rules in litigated cases.");
Struve, supra note 26, at 1112, 1112 n.40.
6 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 50, at § 1029; see also Struve, supra note 26, at 1099,
1112-13, 1158 (noting evolution of notes in terms of length and varied uses).
' Struve, supra note 26, at 1113-14.
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2. The Advisory Committee Makes Monetary Relief Available in
Contemporary Civil Rights Cases
The Advisory Committee does not limit the availability of monetary
relief to historical desegregation cases. The Committee makes clear that
Rule 23(b)(2) not only permits monetary relief, but functions particularly
well for various civil rights cases. To illustrate this, the Committee follows
its description of Rule 23(b)(2) with this example: "Illustrative are various
actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating
unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of spe-
cific enumeration." 65 In Dukes, plaintiffs' case falls squarely within the Ad-
visory Committee's broad description of an illustrative Rule 23(b)(2) civil
rights case. Dukes is an action brought under Title VII where plaintiffs
charge Wal-Mart with discriminating unlawfully against a class of women.
Although the members of the Dukes class may generally be capable of spe-
cific enumeration-like most employment discrimination classes-this does
not disqualify the class from (b)(2) certification. Moreover, the (b)(2) class
certified in Dukes only encompasses back pay-relief that lends itself to
collective proof.6
Wal-Mart argues that Rule 23(b)(2) is not appropriate for all civil rights
cases because otherwise there would be no reason for the Committee to de-
scribe and list "illustrative" ones.67 It is true that not all civil rights cases
may be appropriate for (b)(2) certification, but it does not follow that only
those cases that mirror the "illustrative" ones are. Illustrations are merely
examples or demonstrations, not limitations. The list of illustrative cases is
not meant to be an exhaustive one. Rule 23(b)(2) is not even limited to civil
rights cases, 68 much less to those the Advisory Committee identified as "il-
lustrative" in 1966.
The fact that the note lists prototypical cases at the time Rule 23(b)(2)
was enacted in no way limits (b)(2)'s applicability to civil rights cases today.
Not surprisingly, the Advisory Committee's note to the 1966 amendments to
Rule 23 list civil rights cases from the 1950s and 1960s that sought injunc-
tive and declaratory relief for de jure segregation because that constituted
civil rights litigation endemic of the times. The drafters' explicit mention of
desegregation cases as fitting for a (b)(2) class action was in response to
opposition to desegregation and to efforts to force integration on an individ-
65 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
* The plaintiffs also sought punitive damages which may lend themselves to collective
proof, given their aim to punish and deter corporate misconduct, rather than provide individual
compensation. The plaintiffs, however, did not seek compensatory damages, which risks cre-
ating fissures in the class because of individualized proof issues.
6' See Brief for Petitioner at 48, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 10-277 (Jan. 20,
2011).
68 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (stating that "[s]ubdivision (b)(2) is not
limited to civil-rights cases" and providing examples of non-civil rights cases).
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ual-by-individual basis at the time.69 Wal-Mart incorrectly interprets the Ad-
visory Committee's mention of desegregation cases as a proscription of any
other type of Rule 23(b)(2) civil rights case, claiming that this would violate
Ortiz v. Fibreboard's admonition that a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory class
action stay close to the Advisory Committee's historical models.70 Wal-Mart
construes Ortiz too narrowly. In Ortiz, "[n]one of the examples cited in the
Advisory Committee Notes . .. remotely approach[ed]" the type of limited
fund case plaintiffs sought for Rule 23(b)(1) certification, resulting in decer-
tification of the class." Ortiz did not require plaintiffs' limited fund case to
be identical to the Rule's historical antecedents. On the contrary, recogniz-
ing that limited fund cases could arise from various circumstances, Ortiz
only required that plaintiffs' case share certain characteristics with the histor-
ical models. 72 Moreover, plaintiffs could seek certification that departed
from the traditional norm, so long as they justified this departure. 73
In contrast, Dukes is just the type of case Rule 23(b)(2) was designed to
address. As the Supreme Court has recognized, Rule 23(b)(2) is uniquely
suited to civil rights cases, including those brought today.7 4 It should be no
surprise that discrimination cases almost half a century after Rule 23(b)(2)'s
enactment do not mirror the ones initially described by the Advisory Com-
mittee. The availability of compensatory and punitive damages and jury tri-
als for intentional discrimination claims under Title VII since 1991 have
reshaped modem civil rights cases. Wal-Mart's position that only those civil
rights cases resembling de jure segregation litigation qualify for Rule
23(b)(2) certification is ahistorical and divorced from modem reality. Of
course, civil rights cases today will rarely challenge facially discriminatory
policies based on racial segregation. Discrimination goes beyond just race
69 See David Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and its Implications
for the Modern Class Action 53-62, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1678803.
7o See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 14, 47-49.
7' Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 843 (1999).
72 Id. at 838. It was these characteristics-which justify the limited fund rationale under
the Rules' subdivision-that were "presumptively necessary" for class certification. See id. at
841-42, 845.
" See id. at 842.
74 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) ("Civil rights cases
against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples" of Rule
23(b)(2) class actions). Amchem's Rule 23(b)(3) certification analysis is also instructive. De-
spite the Advisory Committee's observation that "mass accident" cases were "ordinarily not
appropriate" for Rule 23(b)(3) certification, the Supreme Court noted that such cases could
still be certified under certain circumstances. Id. at 625. The Rule's text did "not categorically
exclude mass tort cases" from (b)(3) certification and district courts had been increasingly
certifying such cases since the 1970s. Id. The Committee's warning meant only that counsel
should exercise caution "when individual stakes are high and disparities among class members
great." Id. In Amchem, the Court concluded that counsel had not exercised such caution and
instead interpreted Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement in a way that was "irreconcila-
ble with the Rule's design." Id. Consequently, the Court decertified the class. In Dukes,
interpreting Rule 23(b)(2) to permit civil rights cases involving monetary relief for individual
class members is not "irreconcilable with the Rule's design." When plaintiffs seek predomi-
nantly injunctive and declaratory relief to curtail systemic discrimination-as is the case in
Dukes-certification is consistent with the Rule. Additional caution may be exercised under
(b)(2) by providing notice and an opt-out right, if necessary. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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and has become more subtle and nuanced over time. As the Supreme Court
has aptly noted in an analogous context, because of the changing nature of
societal discrimination, statutes originally meant to prohibit one type of
"evil" may over time appropriately cover others.75 When plaintiffs assert a
"novel" theory of discrimination or bring a civil rights case not identical to
those brought almost a half century ago, plaintiffs may nonetheless seek
(b)(2) certification. 76 Otherwise, Rule 23(b)(2) would cease to work for civil
rights cases today.
C. Proscribing All Monetary Relief Would Go Against Well-Settled Law
A blanket proscription of monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(2) would go
against decades of well-settled law. Wal-Mart's view that no monetary relief
is available under Rule 23(b)(2)77 is far outside the mainstream and contrary
to well-established precedent. Wal-Mart is asking the Court to overrule all
the circuit courts that have addressed the issue.78 Even the Fifth Circuit,
which has set the highest bar for Rule 23(b)(2) certification in its seminal
case Allison, conceded that "Rule 23(b)(2), by its own terns, does not pre-
clude all claims for monetary relief." 9 Wal-Mart's position is far out of step
with all of the appellate courts on this issue, as illustrated by the historical
availability of back pay and non-predominant monetary damages discussed
1 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (declining to
categorically exclude male-on-male sexual harassment claims under Title VII, even though
such harassment was "not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted
Title VII" because "statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasona-
bly comparable evils").
76 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 49. The characterization of plaintiffs' theory
as novel is Wal-Mart's, not the author's.
n Wal-Mart's reliance on Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397 n. 4 (t975), for this proposi-
tion is misplaced. Wal-Mart contends, "This Court's observation that Rule 23(b)(2) certifica-
tion turns on 'the absence of a claim for monetary relief and the nature of the claim asserted'
(Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397 n.4 (1975) (emphasis added)) ends plaintiffs' contention that
'nothing in the text of the Rule places any limit on relief available in a (b)(2) class action."'
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 19, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 10-277 (Mar. 17, 2011).
In fact, Sosna does not state what a Rule 23(b)(2) class "turns on" or requires. The Sosna
Court merely stated, "[a]lthough the complaint did not so specify, the absence of a claim for
monetary relief and the nature of the claim asserted disclose that a Rule 23(b)(2) class action
was contemplated." 419 U.S. 393, 398 n.4. In other words, where a complaint was unclear
about which Rule 23 provision was being invoked, the Court presumed that plaintiffs contem-
plated bringing a (b)(2) class because they did not seek monetary relief and sought a declara-
tion that a residency requirement was unconstitutional. Given that many plaintiffs who
challenge the constitutionality of a government policy may seek solely injunctive or declara-
tory relief under (b)(2), the Court's presumption is unremarkable. Sosna is not a ban on Rule
23(b)(2) class actions seeking monetary relief and certainly does not end the debate over the
correct interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2)'s text.
' Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 618 (9th Cir. 2010).
* Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 411 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added);
see also Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 331 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e do
not hold, nor have we ever held, that monetary relief is fundamentally incompatible with Rule
23(b)(2).").
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in Part II below. 0 Given that no circuit has adopted Wal-Mart's position, the
Supreme Court would strain to adopt this position without violating its duty
to exercise judicial restraint. Wal-Mart invites judicial inventiveness, con-
trary to traditional Supreme Court jurisprudence.'
II. CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING MONETARY RELIEF
UNDER RULE 23(B)(2)
Having determined that Rule 23(b)(2) permits a class to seek monetary
relief, the next question is under what circumstances such relief should be
allowed. If the monetary relief is back pay, it should be allowed. Because
of its equitable nature, back pay has historically been permitted in Rule
23(b)(2) employment discrimination class actions brought under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Wal-Mart's position to the contrary goes
against well-settled law. Alternatively, if the monetary relief is comprised of
monetary damages (compensatory or punitive), it should be allowed so long
as it is not the exclusive or predominant relief sought. As the Advisory
Committee and courts of appeals all recognize, non-exclusive and non-pre-
dominant monetary damages are consistent with Rule 23(b)(2) certification.
A. Back Pay, as an Equitable Remedy, Is Regularly Certified
Under Rule 23(b)(2)
Back pay and other equitable monetary relief should be permitted for
Rule 23(b)(2) classes challenging employment discrimination. The courts
have historically certified (b)(2) class actions seeking monetary relief in the
form of back pay for cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.82 Long before the circuits diverged over which predominance test
should be used for permitting monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2), courts
had been certifying (b)(2) class actions involving back pay. Prior to 1991,
employees had limited recourse under Title VII. They could pursue only
equitable relief, such as injunctions, declarations, reinstatement, back pay,
and front pay.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
enhance enforcement and expand remedies. More specifically, it provided
compensatory and punitive damages, and attendant jury trials, in cases alleg-
soTicor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 124 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (per
curiam) ("The lower courts have consistently held that the presence of monetary damages
claims does not preclude class certification under . . .(b)(2).").
"8 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 841-42 (1999).
82JANICE GOODMAN ET AL., EMPLOYEE RIGHTS LITIGATION: PLEADING AND PRACTICE
§ 2.10(2)(a)(i) at 2-218.54 (2010) ("Back pay is the most common form of monetary relief in
Title VII cases" and is "routinely granted barring extraordinary circumstances."); id. at 2-
218.55 ("the denial of back pay to prevailing plaintiffs is a minor exception rather than the
rule."); LEx K. LARSON, LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (2d ed.) § 92.11 at 5-92
(2010) (citing cases to support the assertion that "the majority of courts have had little diffi-
culty fitting an action for back pay and injunctive relief into Rule 23(b)(2).").
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ing intentional discrimination under Title VII.83 The enactment of the 1991
Act ignited the debate over the propriety of monetary damages under Rule
23(b)(2)-starting with the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Allison v. Citgo. How-
ever, the 1991 Act has not prevented plaintiffs from being awarded back
pay. Pre- and post-1991, courts have regularly permitted back pay to ac-
company injunctive and declaratory relief in (b)(2) classes.
This is not to suggest that courts have not carefully considered the pro-
priety of back pay, but that their consideration has been relatively bloodless.
Why has back pay escaped such controversy? What is it about back pay in
comparison to monetary damages that has enabled the courts to comfortably
permit its inclusion under the (b)(2) tent? The answers to these questions
explain why back pay claims should continue to be certified under (b)(2) and
what characteristics monetary damages should have to fit a (b)(2) class.
Back pay awards have rarely been held to a predominance standard,
and when they have, they have easily met it because of their equitable nature
and uniform relief. Wal-Mart contends that "[t]he fact that plaintiffs are
seeking monetary relief in the form of backpay, as opposed to compensatory
damages, does not alter the conclusion that the request for monetary relief
predominates."84 To the contrary, plaintiffs' pursuit of back pay often moots
the question of predominance altogether. Unlike compensatory and punitive
damages, back pay is not regularly subjected to a predominance test, even by
courts with the most stringent Rule 23(b)(2) certification requirements. For
example, the Fifth Circuit, in Allison, applied its incidental predominance
test only to plaintiffs' compensatory and punitive damages claims, setting
apart back pay because of its equitable nature." Other courts have similarly
excluded back pay from a predominance inquiry because such relief is equi-
table, not legal.86 This distinction, however, is not dispositive. The Fourth
Circuit, for example, applied a predominance test to all monetary relief,
83 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
84 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 53.
85 Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 416 n.10 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Of course,
to the extent the district court applied an incidental damages standard to plaintiffs' claims for
back pay, its analysis was flawed."); id. at 425 ("[W]e hold that nonequitable monetary relief
may be obtained in a class action certified under Rule 23(b)(2) if the predominant relief sought
is injunctive or declaratory.").
86 See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 618 ("[Ilt is ... well accepted, even
by circuits that are generally restrictive in certifying classes seeking monetary damages under
Rule 23(b)(2), that a request for back pay in a Title VII case is fully compatible with the
certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class.") (citing cases). In Dukes, the Ninth Circuit refrained
from deciding whether back pay weighed against (b)(2) certification. Although the Ninth Cir-
cuit created a new objective effects test for determining when monetary relief predominates, as
discussed below in Part I.B.2., the court did not apply it to back pay. Rather, the court adopted
the "consensus view that a request for back pay in a Title VII case is fully consistent with the
certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class action." Id. at 619. The court was persuaded to join the
consensus on the grounds that back pay usually involves uncomplicated factual issues and few
individualized ones, and that back pay is integral to Title VII's "make whole" remedial
scheme. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "claims for punitive damages weigh
against certification under Rule 23(b)(2)" and applied its objective effects predominance test
to plaintiffs' punitive damages claims. Id. at 620-23.
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whether equitable or not.17 But even those circuits applying the predomi-
nance standard to back pay have recognized the compatibility of equitable
monetary relief and Rule 23(b)(2) in the Title VII context.88
Courts have largely certified (b)(2) classes seeking back pay awards by
characterizing them as equitable under Title VII." This characterization has
its roots in the statute itselfo and in employment discrimination jurispru-
dence." As an equitable rather than legal remedy, back pay awards under
Title VII are determined by a judge and not a jury.92 This remains true after
the Civil Rights Act of 1991's provision of a jury trial in Title VII intentional
discrimination cases seeking compensatory or punitive damages.93 Congress
originally gave judges the authority to determine whether or not to award
back pay because of its concern that juries would make biased decisions. 94
Placing the decision in the hands of judges was necessary to address "a
historic evil of national proportions."95 Because of the importance of back
pay, this discretion has been cabined by the Supreme Court's creation of a
presumption in favor of such monetary relief:
[Gliven a finding of unlawful discrimination, back pay should be
denied only for reasons which, if applied generally would not frus-
trate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination
throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries
suffered through past discrimination.96
" See Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 332 (4th Cir. 2006) ("Rule
23(b)(2) class certification is proper in the Title VII context not because back pay is an equita-
ble form of relief, but because injunctive or declaratory relief predominates despite the pres-
ence of a request for back pay."); Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 202 (3d
Cir. 2009) (predominance test required for back pay request).
"8 See Thorn, 445 F.3d at 331; In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 418 (5th Cir.
2004); Dukes, 603 F.3d at 619, 620 n. 42 (joining "consensus view").
' See 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONs § 4.14 (4th ed. 2010) (monetary relief that is equitable in nature is characteris-
tic of monetary relief permitted under b(2)).
* See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006); see also Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417
F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969) ("The demand for back pay is not in the nature of a claim for
damages, but rather is an integral part of the statutory equitable remedy, to be determined
through the exercise of the court's discretion, and not by a jury.").
" Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that
Rule 23(b)(2) permits monetary relief that is equitable, and "[b]ack pay, of course, had long
been recognized as an equitable remedy under Title VII."); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
92 LARSON, supra note 82, § 92.02; Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73,
78 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009) ("[B]ack pay and front pay are equitable remedies to be determined by
the court.").
9 LARSON, supra note 82; see, e.g., Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 469 F.3d 311 (3d
Cir. 2006) (back pay within the court's discretion, not the jury's, after the Civil Rights Act of
1991); Lutz v. Glendale Union High Sch., 403 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). But see Johnson v.
Spencer Press of Me., Inc., 364 F.3d 368 (1st Cir. 2004) (juries permitted to make back pay
determinations when deciding liability and compensatory damages).
*' See Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577,
1630 & n.297 (2002).
" Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 416.
9 Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
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Back pay has been essential to these twin statutory goals and thus favored by
the courts for decades.
Back pay has long been permitted in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions be-
cause it is an integral part of Title VII's broad remedial scheme.97 Title VII
was designed to "make whole" those who suffered employment discrimina-
tion. To facilitate this, the statute gives the courts the power to enjoin a
defendant from engaging in discriminatory practices and to order appropriate
affirmative relief.98 Congress has made clear that not only is injunctive and
declaratory relief necessary to curtail discrimination, but back pay is an es-
sential ingredient in making a victim of discrimination "whole."" Back pay
compensates the victim for earnings and other financial benefits that he or
she would have received but for the discrimination. Not surprisingly, then,
courts have regularly certified (b)(2) classes involving back pay to make
victims of systemic discrimination whole.1'"
As part of Title VII's remedial scheme, back pay has been permitted in
(b)(2) classes because of its role in deterring future systemic discrimination.
In addition to playing a restorative function, back pay awards encourage
voluntary compliance:
The role that backpay plays in employment discrimination cases is
twofold. First, . .. it provides compensation for the tangible eco-
nomic loss suffered by those who are discriminated against. Sec-
ondly, and even more importantly, because backpay awards act as
a deterrent to employers . . . , such awards play a crucial role in the
remedial process . . . . They provide the spur or catalyst which
causes employers . . . to self-examine and to self-evaluate their
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as pos-
sible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in
this country's history. If backpay is consistently awarded, compa-
nies . . . will certainly find it in their best interest to remedy their
employment procedures without court intervention, whether that
intervention is initiated by the Government or by individual
employees.101
Because of back pay's equitable nature, many courts, including the Fifth
Circuit in Allison, have concluded that an "award of back pay, as one ele-
" In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 418 (5th Cir. 2004); Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998); Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d
571, 619 (9th Cir. 2010).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006).
9 Title VII's purpose is "[t]o make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole," which
requires "elimination of the particular unlawful employment practice complained of, but also
"so far as possible, restorling victims] to a position where they would have been were it not
for the unlawful discrimination." 118 CONG. Rac. 7168 (1972). See also GOODMAN, Supra
note 82, at 2-218.70 ("Particularly in the case of class-based discrimination, the prohibitory
injunction is often coupled with affirmative relief.").
" See, e.g., Allison, 151 F.3d at 415.
'' U.S. v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973) (quoting in part Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).
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ment of the equitable remedy, conflicts in no way with the limitations of
Rule 23(b)(2)."l 02 Back pay-like injunctive and declaratory relief-is eq-
uitable, and therefore weighs on the side favoring class certification."'
However, because back pay is monetary, other courts have come to the
opposite conclusion."0* Just because monetary relief is equitable does not
mean that it is always appropriate for (b)(2) certification. Any type of relief
in addition to injunctive or declaratory relief should not undermine the cohe-
siveness or homogeneity of a (b)(2) class.10 Because members of a Rule
23(b)(2) class are not entitled to notice of the class action or an opportunity
to exclude themselves from the litigation, the interests of the class members
must be aligned with each other so as to provide them due process. The
cohesiveness that justifies a mandatory class arguably starts to break down
when, after a class-wide finding of liability, class members seek individual
monetary awards.106 Thus, monetary awards involving complicated, highly
individualized assessments or hearings would militate against (b)(2)
certification.
But because back pay awards in the Title VII context tend to involve
relatively uncomplicated factual determinations, comprise few individual-
ized issues, and can be calculated on a class-wide basis, this type of mone-
tary relief has been and should be regularly certified under (b)(2).10 For
example, back pay for each class member may be calculated on a statistical
basis, using a formula that approximates over time what salary an employee
would have received but for an employer's discrimination. Because back
pay lends itself to common proof, it does not jeopardize the cohesiveness
and homogeneity of the class. In contrast, compensatory damages-which
compensate individuals for emotional harm and distress-do not often lend
themselves to the same common proof, but instead require individual evalua-
tions. Similarly, to the extent that punitive damages cannot be proven on a
class-wide basis because of their dependence on the recovery of compensa-
tory damages, punitive damages may also require individualized determina-
102Allison, 151 F.3d at 415.
.0. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), overruled in part
on other grounds as stated in Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
1" See, e.g., Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 331, 332 (4th Cir. 2006).
'' Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See also Wetzel v. Lib-
erty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256 (3d Cir. 1975) (describing a (b)(2) class as "homoge-
neous without any conflicting interests between the members of the class").
6 See Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 94.
10 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 619 (9th Cir. 2010); Thorn, 445 F.3d at
331; In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 418; Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 296 F.3d 443, 449 (6th Cir. 2002); see LARSON, supra note 82, § 92.11 ("It is some-
times impractical, when a large class is involved, to calculate back pay for each member on an
individual basis. The approaches that have been adopted by the various circuits confirm that a
court may put into motion the mechanism for an award of back pay on a class-wide, rather
than individual, basis."); id. ("[C]ourts generally have employed a class-wide remedy when
individual determinations are impracticable."); see, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257, 262 (citing various methods of calculating class-wide back pay). But
see Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 1993) (individualized computation of
back pay used in large class action).
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tions. 108 To the extent back pay offers a uniform remedy not requiring highly
individualized assessments, such monetary relief maintains the necessary co-
hesion for a mandatory class.
The relevant factor in (b)(2) certification is the nexus between back pay
and the injunctive or declaratory relief. To the extent that back pay relates to
the injunctive or declaratory relief, such monetary relief is entirely consistent
with (b)(2) certification. Therefore, when assessing the propriety of any
type of monetary relief under (b)(2), a court should consider the relationship
between this relief and the injunction or declaration pursued.'" The closer
the nexus, the more advisable the certification. Where the only monetary
relief certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is back pay, as in Dukes, there is a
strong basis for finding that the monetary relief does not predominate.110
In sum, for the reasons described above, courts have regularly permit-
ted back pay under Rule 23(b)(2) and should continue to do so. To the ex-
tent that other types of monetary relief resemble back pay, as described
above, such relief should be permitted under (b)(2) as well.
B. Monetary Damages That Do Not Predominate Are Regularly
Certified Under Rule 23(b)(2)
1. Predominance
The courts of appeals have uniformly permitted monetary damages in a
(b)(2) class so long as they do not predominate over injunctive or declara-
tory relief. With the Ninth Circuit's Dukes decision, the courts of appeals
have now carved out three distinct tests for determining when monetary
damages predominate. These tests properly ground themselves in the Advi-
sory Committee's guidance that monetary damages should not be the exclu-
sive or predominant form of final relief sought. As discussed above,
adoption of the Advisory Committee's predominance principle is appropriate
given the Committee's seminal role in formulating and interpreting the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. A predominance test properly reflects the rule
108 See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 417-18 (5th Cir. 1998). The Fifth
Circuit acknowledges that punitive damages may be awarded on a class-wide basis when the
class members have been subjected to the same discriminatory act. Id. at 417. Other courts
have taken a more liberal approach, permitting punitive damages under Rule 23(b)(2) on the
grounds that the focus of such damages is on the defendant's conduct. See, e.g., Barefield v.
Chevron, No. C 86-2427, 1988 WL 188433 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1988).
11 Some civil procedure professors have suggested that the conduct underlying the mone-
tary and injunctive relief claims should be related as a prerequisite for (b)(2) certification. See
Brief for Civil Procedure Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 34-35,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 10-277 (Mar. 11, 2011).
no In Dukes, plaintiffs also sought punitive damages. The Ninth Circuit held that the
district court abused its discretion by certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class involving punitive dam-
ages, without first determining whether the plaintiffs predominantly sought injunctive or de-
claratory relief. Thus, the district court is to decide on remand whether the punitive damages
claims are appropriate for certification under Rule 23(b)(2), or alternatively, under Rule
23(b)(3).
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makers' intention to permit some measured amount of monetary damages to
accompany the injunctive and declaratory relief. Therefore, predominance
should anchor any test the Supreme Court adopts for allowing monetary
damages under (b)(2).
Not only does a predominance test mirror the drafters' objectives, it also
serves important competing interests. On the one hand, a predominance test
addresses due process concerns. It ensures that the class is sufficiently cohe-
sive to justify certification of a mandatory class and that the benefits of ag-
gregate litigation go to the class as whole."' Predominance under Rule
23(b)(2) serves as a proxy for the procedural due process protections (notice
and opt out) available under Rule 23(b)(3).11 2 Consequently, there is gener-
ally no need to provide such protections-either as an addition to a (b)(2)
class action, or alternatively, as a requirement of a (b)(3) class action" -
when injunctive or declaratory relief predominates and systemic conduct is
being challenged. On the other hand, a predominance test serves judicial
economy by favoring collective action over seriatim individual litigation.,l 4
The predominance approach represents a reasonable middle ground for
determining the propriety of (b)(2) certification involving monetary dam-
ages. In Allison v. Citgo, relying on Rule 23(b)(2)'s text, plaintiffs argued
that there was no predominance test for monetary relief; certification is
available for all relief."' Similarly, in Dukes, relying on the Rule's text,
Wal-Mart argues that there is no predominance test for monetary relief; cer-
tification is available only for injunctive and declaratory relief. The Fifth
Circuit-which has adopted the most rigorous standard for (b)(2) certifica-
tion of monetary damages in Allison-ultimately chose an "intermediate ap-
proach" by allowing monetary damages as long as they were not exclusive
or predominant, as contemplated by the Advisory Committee.116 All of the
other circuits have followed, adopting some version of predominance. Thus,
Wal-Mart's position radically departs from a uniform interpretation of the
law by the courts. The real question is how courts should determine
predominance.
' See Thorn, 445 F.3d at 330 (Rule 23(b)(2)'s predominance test functions like that of
Rule 23(b)(3), ensuring the requisite class cohesion); Allison, 151 F.3d at 414-15 (predomi-
nance test protects due process interests of class members who potentially want to seek indi-
vidualized monetary relief).
112 See Thorn, 445 F.3d at 330 n.25; Monumental Life Ins. 365 F.3d at 417; Allison, 151
F.3d at 412-15.
" Monumental Life Ins., 365 F.3d at 417 ("[T]o deny certification on the basis that the
damage claims would be better brought as a Rule 23(b)(3) class serves no function other than
to elevate form over substance.").
"' Allison, 151 F.3d at 414-15; see also id. at 414 n.8 (contending that efficiency and
manageability standards of (b)(3) are implied in a predominance requirement under (b)(2)).
"s Allison, 151 F.3d at 410-11; see also id. at 430 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
"6 Allison, 151 F.3d at 411. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court's imposi-
tion of a predominance test was not an error, even in light of the Supreme Court's doubt over
the availability of monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2), expressed in Ticor Title Ins. Co. v.
Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994). Allison, 151 F.3d at 411 n.3.
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2. The Debate Over the Predominance Test
While the courts agree that predominance is the linchpin of whether
monetary damages are appropriate for classes seeking injunctive or declara-
tory relief under Rule 23(b)(2) class, there is significant disagreement over
how predominance should be determined. The courts of appeals have devel-
oped three distinct approaches to defining "predominance."
In Allison, the Fifth Circuit established the most demanding test for
predominance. The court concluded that monetary relief predominates un-
less it is "incidental" to the injunctive or declaratory relief sought.' Inci-
dental damages are those "that flow directly from liability to the class as a
whole on the claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory re-
lief.""' Incidental damages should 1) "be concomitant with, not merely
consequential to, class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief"; 2) "be capable
of computation by means of objective standards and not dependent in any
significant way on the intangible, subjective differences of each class mem-
ber's circumstances"; 3) "not require additional hearings to resolve the dis-
parate merits of each individual's case"; and 4) "neither introduce new and
substantial legal or factual issues, nor entail complex individualized determi-
nations.""' In sum, such monetary damages function as a group remedy
adjunct to the injunctive relief.
In Allison, applying the "incidental" test, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's conclusion that neither the compensatory nor punitive dam-
ages were incidental to the requested injunctive and declaratory relief
sought, thereby making (b)(2) certification inappropriate. In a nutshell, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that compensatory damages could not be determined
objectively and instead required specific, individualized proof for each class
member.'20 Moreover, because the punitive damages were dependent upon
the compensatory damages calculations, neither could be determined objec-
tively and without individualized proof. 121
The "incidental" test, also adopted by the Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits,122 is the most difficult to meet for Title VII cases because it leads to
the almost inescapable conclusion that compensatory and punitive damages
are not in fact incidental.123 Consequently, some commentators have con-
cluded that the "incidental" approach is the death knell for such class
actions.124
"' Allison, 151 F.3d at 415.
" Id.
1
20 Id. at 416-17.
121 Id. at 416-18.
122 See Reeb v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 649-50 (6th Cir. 2006); In re
Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 2005); Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812
(llth Cir. 2001).
123 See Allison, 151 F.3d at 417 (compensatory and punitive damages are by "nature" not
"incidental").
1 See, e.g., Harvey S. Bartlett III, Determining Whether a Title VII Plaintiff Class's "Aim
is True": The Legacy of Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. for Employment Discrimination
398 [Vol. 5
Class Actions at the Crossroads
The Second Circuit, in Robinson, explicitly rejected the incidental ap-
proach in favor of an "ad hoc" balancing test for determining whether mon-
etary damages predominate under Rule 23(b)(2).1 25 The Second Circuit
concluded that a district court must consider "the evidence presented at a
class certification hearing and the arguments of counsel" and then determine
the "relative importance of the remedies sought, given all of the facts and
circumstances of the case." 26 A court may certify a (b)(2) class when, in its
"informed, sound judicial discretion," it finds that:
[T]he positive weight or value [to the plaintiffs] of the injunctive
or declaratory relief sought is predominant even though compensa-
tory or punitive damages are . . . claimed . . . and . . . class treat-
ment would be efficient and manageable, thereby achieving an
appreciable measure of judicial economy.'27
To certify a (b)(2) class action when plaintiffs seek monetary damages and
injunctive or declaratory relief, a court should, at a minimum, satisfy itself
that:
[E]ven in the absence of a possible monetary recovery, reasonable
plaintiffs would bring the suit to obtain the injunctive or declara-
tory relief sought; and . . . the injunctive or declaratory relief
sought would be both reasonably necessary and appropriate were
the plaintiffs to succeed on the merits.'28
The "ad hoc" balancing approach incorporates the goals of flexibility and
judicial economy into the predominance test. Plaintiffs bringing Title VII
cases find it easier to meet the (b)(2) certification criteria under this ap-
proach because non-incidental damages are not automatically eliminated.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit, in Dukes, has created an alternative predomi-
nance test, rejecting the incidental test and a test that relied solely on the
plaintiffs' subjective intent.'29 The Ninth Circuit fashioned an "objective ef-
fects" test, which focuses on the practical impact monetary relief will have
on the litigation if the case is certified under Rule 23(b)(2).co Relying on
Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2), 74 TUL. L. REV. 2163, 2165, 2184 (2000) ("Allison
represents the demise of the effectiveness of the Civil Rights Act of 1991"); see also Allison,
151 F.3d at 431 (Dennis, J., dissenting) ("The majority's rule ... threatens a drastic curtail-
ment of the use of (b)(2) class actions in the enforcement of Title VII and other civil rights
acts."); Reeb, 435 F.3d at 654 (Keith, J., dissenting).




129 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 616 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Molski v.
Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2003) (adopting approach similar to Robinson).
M Dukes, 603 F.3d at 616-17 (explaining district courts should evaluate the "objective
'effect of the relief sought' on the litigation.") (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151
F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998)). While the Ninth Circuit uses the generic term "monetary
relief' when describing the objective effects test, it does not actually apply it to plaintiffs' back
pay claims. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit treats plaintiffs' punitive damages claims-the only
damages claims plaintiffs sought-very differently. The Ninth Circuit applies all four factors
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the dictionary definition, the Ninth Circuit concluded that monetary relief is
"predominant" if it is "superior [in] strength, influence or authority" to the
injunctive or declaratory relief.'"' The relevant factors to consider when de-
termining if monetary relief predominates are
whether [it] determines the key procedures that will be used,
whether it introduces new and significant legal and factual issues,
whether it requires individualized hearings, and whether its size
and nature-as measured by recovery per class member-raise
particular due process and manageability concerns . . . .132
This new test explicitly adds due process as a consideration in the predomi-
nance determination. Moreover, the test permits non-incidental damages-
contrary to Allison-but moves away from the plaintiff-valuation approach
favored in Robinson.3 3 As such, the Ninth Circuit's approach may come
down the middle in terms of its impact on permitting (b)(2) certification of
Title VII case involving monetary damages. Its nascent status makes it too
early to tell.
Despite their apparent differences, all three tests correctly anchor them-
selves in predominance. This is important because it offers a framework for
the Supreme Court when deciding under what circumstances monetary dam-
ages should be permitted in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action.
In sum, the availability of back pay under Rule 23(b)(2) is settled law.
The (b)(2) door is regularly open to this equitable type of monetary relief for
plaintiffs challenging systemic discrimination under Title VII. Similarly, so
long as they do not predominate, monetary damages are commonly available
under the Rule's provision. The only issue left is which predominance test
should apply. The next part explores this complex question by critiquing
each test and conducting a comparative analysis of them.
III. ANALYSIS OF RULE 23(B)(2) CERTIFICATION JURISPRUDENCE
INVOLVING MONETARY DAMAGES
Whether endorsing an existing test or cutting one from whole cloth, the
Supreme Court may find certain guiding principles useful in determining
when monetary damages predominate, thereby justifying (b)(2) certification.
Using these principles, this part critiques the courts of appeals' three pre-
dominance tests and concludes that the youngest one, formulated in Dukes,
may provide the most useful insights.
to the punitive damages claims, modeling what the district court might consider on remand, Id.
at 621-22.
'"' Id. at 616.
132 Id. at 616 (No one factor is determinative).
13 Id. at 616-17.
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A. Guiding Principles
Coursing throughout the body of case law are important principles upon
which the Supreme Court may rely when determining the proper circum-
stances for permitting monetary damages in a Rule 23(b)(2) class. These
principles are judicial discretion, judicial economy, due process, and civil
rights enforcement.
First, no matter which predominance test is adopted for permitting
monetary damages under (b)(2), the district courts must be given enough
discretion to conduct the "rigorous analysis" necessary to determine the pro-
priety of class certification, as stated in General Telephone Co. of the South-
west v. Falcon.13 4 In order to ascertain whether Rule 23's criteria have been
met, judges must be able to fully analyze each case based on its own factual
record and unique context. The complexity of the class certification assess-
ment requires this, and district court judges are uniquely positioned to make
these frontline determinations.
Second, another factor relevant to any predominance test is judicial
economy. The class action device is designed to achieve judicial economy
because aggregate litigation is more efficient than litigating similar individ-
ual cases seriatim. The predominance test should not be so demanding that
it becomes too difficult for litigants to get a case certified, thereby compro-
mising the judicial economy aggregate litigation has to offer.
However, in order for a class action to be efficient, the case must be
manageable. Unlike Rule 23(b)(3), which explicitly incorporates managea-
bility into its analysis,'35 Rule 23(b)(2) does not. Despite this absence, some
courts have read a manageability requirement into the Rule,'36 in recognition
of the practical implications of allowing monetary damages in a (b)(2) class.
Third, when considering under what circumstances monetary damages
should be permitted in a mandatory Rule 23(b)(2) class action, an important
factor is whether absent class members will be afforded due process. The
134 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982).
' One of the criteria of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action is that it be "superior to other availa-
ble methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Its provision (D) identifies as pertinent to this finding "the likely difficulties in managing a
class action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
136 Compare Shook v. El Paso Cnty., Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 386 F.3d 963, 972-73 (10th
Cir. 2004) (considering manageability and efficiency in (b)(2) determination), with Forbush v.
J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[Mianageability and judicial econ-
omy are . . . irrelevant to 23(b)(2) class actions."). See generally ROBERT H. KLONoFF, ED-
WARD K.M. BILICH & SUZETTE M. MALVEAUX, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTIPARTY
LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 210 (2d ed. 2006) (describing conflict). For example, the
Ninth Circuit identifies manageability as a factor courts should consider when determining the
practical impact of monetary relief and whether this relief predominates. See Dukes, 603 F.3d
at 617 (monetary damages predominate when their size and nature "raise . .. manageability
concerns"). The Second Circuit permits (b)(2) certification when injunctive or declaratory
relief predominates and judicial economy is served. Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R.,
267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (a judge may allow (b)(2) certification when "class treatment
would be efficient and manageable, thereby achieving an appreciable measure of judicial
economy.").
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Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Consti-
tution protect persons from deprivation of "life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."' Because money is considered "property," district
court judges must exercise restraint when requiring persons to participate in
a class action involving monetary damages. Since members of a (b)(2) class
are not entitled to notice of the lawsuit or a right to opt out, care must be
taken to protect their due process rights. As the Supreme Court stated in
dicta in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the "inherent tension between representa-
tive suits and the day-in-court ideal is only magnified if applied to damage
claims gathered in a mandatory class" because the "legal rights of absent
class members . . . are resolved regardless of either their consent, or . .. their
express wish to the contrary."' 38
In fact, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Court concluded that
when plaintiffs sought "wholly or predominately" monetary damages in a
mandatory class, absent class members could be bound even without con-
tacts with the forum state sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over
them.13 9 The Court concluded, however, that under such circumstances,
prior to extinguishing an absent class member's cause of action, the class
member must "receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate
in the litigation" and "at a minimum" be given "an opportunity to remove
himself from the class," in addition to having his interests adequately repre-
sented.140 Although the Court did not rule on what due process requires
when plaintiffs seek monetary damages in a mandatory class that are less
than exclusive or predominant,141 the Court has suggested, in Ticor Title In-
surance Co. v. Brown, that the right to opt out found in Rule 23(b)(3) may
be necessary.142 Because of the due process concerns of certifying a
mandatory class with monetary damages claims, judges must be mindful to
provide additional procedural protections when necessary.
Finally, a predominance test for monetary damages should take into
account the special role Rule 23(b)(2) plays in enforcing civil rights. When
drafting Rule 23(b)(2), the Advisory Committee specifically identified civil
'3 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. at amend. XIV, § 1.
1 527 U.S. 815, 846-47 (1999).
' 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (emphasis added).
'0 Id.
" The Court noted its "continuing interest" in this question in Adams v. Robertson, but
concluded that the petition for writ of certiorari had been improvidently granted in that case.
520 U.S. 83, 92 n.6 (1997).
142 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994) (per curiam). However, this observation was made only as
dicta in a hypothetical. Moreover, Ticor did not squarely address the question; this per curiam
opinion only held that a writ of certiorari was improvidently granted and that the case should
therefore be dismissed. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 411 n.3 (5th Cir.
1998) (noting "absence of a clearer statement by the Supreme Court"). The concept of due
process has been explicitly incorporated in the Ninth Circuit's analysis for determining the
predominance of monetary damages in a (b)(2) class. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603
F.3d 571, 617 (9th Cir. 2010) (monetary damages predominate when their size or nature
"raise[s] particular due process . .. concerns" for individual class member recovery), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 795 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277).
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rights cases as illustrative of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions.'43 Moreover, the
Supreme Court and others have recognized Rule 23(b)(2)'s unique role as a
vehicle specifically tailored to civil rights enforcement.'"
B. Critique of the Rule 23(b)(2) Predominance Tests
Given the rationales justifying (b)(2) certification, and the various prin-
ciples anchoring the availability of monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2),
how do the current predominance tests adopted by the courts of appeals for
monetary damages fare? The courts of appeals' three distinct approaches
each offer valuable insights.
1. Incidental Test
As an initial matter, the Fifth Circuit's approach-the incidental test-
appropriately recognizes the availability of monetary relief under Rule
23(b)(2) as intended by the Rule's drafters, the Advisory Committee. Like
all of the circuit courts to address the issue, the Fifth Circuit, in Allison, and
its sister circuits correctly defer to legislative intent in light of the Rule's
ambiguity. The Fifth Circuit and its followers, thus, fittingly use predomi-
nance as the standard for permitting monetary damages for a (b)(2) class.
The incidental test protects class members' due process rights by ensur-
ing the cohesiveness and homogeneity of a (b)(2) class. However, by estab-
lishing such a high bar for damages claims that are allowed under Rule
23(b)(2), the Fifth Circuit compromises other important goals, such as pro-
tecting judicial discretion, civil rights enforcement, and judicial economy.
The incidental test promotes due process by using an objective standard
that largely tracks the approach used by many courts for justifying the inclu-
sion of back pay in Rule 23(b)(2) classes. Incidental damages, much like
back pay, "flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims
forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief." 45 Incidental dam-
ages resemble the equitable remedy of back pay because of the close nexus
between them and the injunctive or declaratory relief sought.146 Moreover,
like back pay, incidental damages do not threaten the cohesiveness of the
class because they are "capable of computation by means of objective stan-
dards" rather than "intangible, subjective differences" for each class mem-
143 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note ("Illustrative are various actions in the
civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usu-
ally one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.").
'" See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) ("Civil rights cases
against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples [of
(b)(2) classes]."); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.43(l)(b),
§ 23-192 (3d ed. 2005) ("Rule 23(b)(2) was promulgated ... essentially as a tool for facilitat-
ing civil rights actions.").
145 Allison, 151 F.3d at 415.
14 See id. (incidental damages are "concomitant with, not merely consequential to, class-
wide injunctive or declaratory relief").
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ber, and do not require "complex individualized determinations." 47 Because
incidental damages mirror some of the characteristics of back pay and other
equitable monetary relief, they fit well under the (b)(2) tent.
Moreover, many courts are drawn to the incidental predominance test
because it offers simplicity and administrative ease. Most bright lines do.
But just because incidental damages are like back pay, this does not mean
these are the only damages that should be allowed under Rule 23(b)(2). The
problem with the Fifth Circuit's approach is that it is unnecessarily restric-
tive. Equating non-predominant with "incidental" goes too far. This ap-
proach excludes monetary relief contemplated by the Advisory
Committee-i.e., monetary damages that fall short of predominating but sur-
pass incidental. Consequently, the incidental test suffers from being over-
inclusive.148
The Fifth Circuit's approach fails to protect the broad judicial discretion
so critical to the complex class certification decision. The incidental test, as
applied in Title VII and similar cases, functions as a bright line test, forbid-
ding district court judges from using all of the factual evidence and procedu-
ral options at their disposal. Their ability to analyze cases on a case-by-case
basis and conduct the "rigorous analysis" required by Falcon is further un-
dermined by the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of compensatory and punitive
damages as being "by nature" incidental. For all intents and purposes, this
interpretation shuts down the demanding examination that judges are ex-
pected to conduct and dictates the outcome of certification decisions for a
whole class of cases.
Although incidental damages and back pay share a similar basis for
justifying certification with injunctive or declaratory relief under (b)(2), dis-
cussed above, the similarities stop there. Courts have consistently permitted
back pay in (b)(2) class actions, in large measure because of its importance
to civil rights enforcement and Title VII's broad remedial purpose. By con-
trast, the Fifth Circuit's application of the incidental predominance test com-
promises plaintiffs' capacity to eradicate systemic discrimination, to be made
whole, and to deter future misconduct.149 This constricted approach under-
mines Title VII enforcement in a number of ways.
First, the incidental approach undermines civil rights enforcement by
pressuring plaintiffs to forgo relief to which they are entitled under Title VII
as a cost of class certification. Although Congress sought to bolster the
rights of victims of intentional discrimination and expand remedies available
147 Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998).
148 See W. Lyle Stamps, Note, Getting Title VII Back on Track: Leaving Allison Behind
for the Robinson Line, 17 BYU J. PuB. L. 411, 432-33, 447-48 (2003) (calling the Allison
approach over-inclusive because Rule 23(b)(2) text and accompanying Advisory Committee
note require that monetary damages be secondary, insignificant, or dependent upon injunctive
or declaratory relief).
149 For a fuller exploration of how the incidental approach compromises Title VII enforce-
ment, see Suzette M. Malveaux, Fighting to Keep Employment Discrimination Class Actions
Alive: How Allison v. Citgo's Predomination Requirement Threatens to Undermine Title VII
Enforcement, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 405 (2005).
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to them, the incidental test jeopardizes employees' ability to obtain full relief
in the class action context. Plaintiffs may feel compelled to choose punitive
over compensatory damages,5 0 to limit the potential amount of damages for
class members through the use of certain formulas, or to forgo damages
altogether as the price of class certification. As a result, fewer monetary
damages will be awarded to those who deserve them."'
Second, the incidental approach compromises Title VII enforcement by
compelling plaintiffs to seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which im-
poses a more formidable certification standard not historically used in Title
VII cases. This compulsion subjects plaintiffs to greater costs and burdens,
thereby preventing those with small claims and limited resources from
bringing potentially meritorious civil rights claims altogether. Because Rule
23(b)(3) requires plaintiffs to send personal notice to each individual class
member who can be identified through reasonable effort,15 2 it may be too
expensive for plaintiffs to bring this type of class action. Additionally, be-
cause Rule 23(b)(3) requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that common ques-
tions predominate over individual ones and that a class action is superior to
other mechanisms for resolving the dispute, plaintiffs may fail to meet this
higher bar in those jurisdictions that presume damages call for individual-
ized determinations. Thus, Wal-Mart's reassurance that, if plaintiffs cannot
get a (b)(2) class certified, they can still seek (b)(3) certification'53 offers
cold comfort.
Third, the incidental approach undermines civil rights enforcement by
reducing the number of Title VII class actions. The Fifth Circuit's conclu-
sion that compensatory and punitive damages are "by nature" non-incidental
precludes (b)(2) certification. 154 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit's presumption
that compensatory and punitive damages require individualized assessments
also precludes (b)(3) certification. This is because, under such circum-
stances, the inescapable conclusion for the Fifth Circuit is that individual
damages issues dwarf issues common to the class, in contravention of Rule
23(b)(3). This deprivation of the class action device will result in unchecked
systemic employment discrimination because of the critical role the class
action plays in Title VII enforcement.
"so This is because punitive damages arguably do not require individualized determina-
tions that compensatory damages might require. Punitive damages are meant to punish and
deter, so a claim for this type of damages does not hinge on facts unique to each member, but
instead focuses on defendant's conduct toward the class as a whole. Moreover, punitive dam-
ages are more likely to be treated as an outgrowth of defendant's systemic conduct, and there-
fore to be considered incidental. See id. at 417-19.
151 See id. at 419-25.
112 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
m See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 49.
1 Allison contends that punitive damages may be awarded on a class-wide basis, without
individualized inquiries, when all class members are subjected to the same discriminatory act.
However, Allison's application of its incidental test in reality forecloses certification of such
damages for Title VII cases because the court concludes that punitive damages are by nature
dependent on non-incidental compensatory damages. 151 F.3d at 417-18, 419.
2011] 405
Harvard Law & Policy Review
Although employees may pursue individual Title VII claims or have
their interests represented by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), these alternatives to aggregate litigation offer little solace.
These avenues simply cannot replace the unique and important role class
actions play in vindicating civil rights. An employer can more easily mask
discrimination when challenged on an individual level than on a class-wide
basis. Plaintiffs in class actions can craft remedies and injunctive relief far
greater in scope than in individual cases. The class action mechanism en-
ables individuals to pool their resources and thereby share the risks and bur-
dens of bringing claims,' as well as more easily retain counsel. Without
access to a class action, an individual may be too fearful of retaliation to
challenge his or her employer. Finally, a finding of class-wide liability shifts
the burden of proof in favor of the plaintiffs. By proving a pattern or prac-
tice of discrimination, each class member enjoys the rebuttable presumption
that he or she was victimized by the discrimination, and the employer must
prove otherwise. 15 6 In the event the EEOC decides to bring a pattern or
practice case, its effectiveness as a government agency may be compromised
by limited resources and politics.
While the incidental test purports to protect absent class members' due
process rights, it may ultimately undermine them by preventing class mem-
bers from vindicating their statutory rights at all. Here, the best may turn out
to be the enemy of the good. For all of the above reasons, preservation of
the class action is fundamental to Title VII enforcement.
Finally, the incidental test undermines judicial economy by making it
so difficult for plaintiffs seeking monetary damages in addition to injunctive
or declaratory relief to act collectively. The civil justice system does not
enjoy the efficiencies of aggregate litigation given this difficulty. On bal-
ance, the incidental test fails to strike the right balance and poses more
problems than solutions.
2. Ad Hoc Balancing Test
On the other end of the spectrum is the ad hoc balancing test, designed
by the Second Circuit in Robinson for determining when monetary damages
are permitted in a (b)(2) class. Like the incidental test, the ad hoc balancing
test properly recognizes the availability of monetary relief under Rule
23(b)(2), resolving the text's ambiguity in accordance with the Advisory
Committee's intent. The ad hoc approach, however, distinguishes itself from
the incidental approach in important ways. The ad hoc approach respects
' See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Winsdor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) ("The policy at the
very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights.") (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). Although
an individual can recover up to $300,000 in damages under Title VII, the litigation may still be
a negative value suit if the employee is not able to share high litigation costs with others.
116 See Malveaux, supra note 149, at 417-19.
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judicial discretion, promotes judicial economy, and supports civil rights en-
forcement. But it also poses due process concerns.
First, unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit gives trial judges
broad discretion when deciding whether and how to permit monetary dam-
ages to accompany injunctive or declaratory relief in a (b)(2) class action.
By retaining this broad discretion, the Second Circuit promotes flexibility
and respect for the trial courts. The ad hoc balancing approach promotes
judicial autonomy by permitting district court judges to weigh the "relative
importance of the remedies sought, given all of the facts and circumstances
of the case" and to use their "informed, sound judicial discretion" when
deciding (b)(2) certification.5 7 Monetary damages under (b)(2) need not be
incidental.
The problem, however, is that what judges gain in flexibility, they often
lose in clarity and uniformity.15 1 Prior to adopting its current predominance
test, the Ninth Circuit, in Molski v. Gleich, rejected the incidental approach
in favor of one that assessed the relative value of the relief sought based on
the plaintiffs' valuation.'5 9 As the Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded in
Dukes, using a predominance test that relied on plaintiffs' subjective intent
was incomplete and resulted in "entirely discretionary" certification deci-
sions.1 6 0 Moreover, according to the Ninth Circuit, Molski's lack of objective
guidance on how to determine when monetary relief predominates allowed
judges to effectively police (b)(2) class actions only when "a request for
injunctive relief is obviously a ruse." 6' The Ninth Circuit's decision to over-
rule Molski makes sense given its sole reliance on exploring plaintiff motive
and ineffectiveness at detecting manipulation.162
Second, the ad hoc approach properly takes into account judicial econ-
omy.' 6 The test considers the practical impact monetary relief might have
on a (b)(2) class by introducing efficiency and manageability into the
calculus.'1' While both Molski and Robinson focus on plaintiff intent,
Robinson requires district court judges to find that "class treatment would be
efficient and manageable" as a condition of (b)(2) certification involving
monetary relief.165 In addition to this judicial economy requirement, the Sec-
ond Circuit in Robinson also requires district court judges to check their
reliance on plaintiffs' assessment against a more objective standard when
' Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (cita-
tions omitted).
'" See Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON
L. REV. 813, 829 (2004) ("[Robinson] approach sacrifices simplicity for flexibility.").
' See Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 950 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[W]e have focused on the
language of Rule 23(b)(2) and the intent of the plaintiffs in bringing the suit.").
'"Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 616-17 (9th Cir. 2010) (criticizing
"nebulous and imprecise inquiry into the plaintiffs' intent").
6' See id. at 616.
162 The Ninth Circuit also overturned Molski because of its failure to consider the practical
impact monetary relief might have on the litigation itself. See id.
163 Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 165 (2d Cir. 2001).
'6" Id. at 164.
165 Id.
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establishing the predominant value of the relief sought. Specifically, the
Second Circuit not only requires a district court to determine "the positive
weight or value [to the plaintiffs] of the injunctive or declaratory relief
sought," but also directs the court to, "at a minimum, satisfy itself . .. [that]
even in the absence of a possible monetary recovery, reasonable plaintiffs
would bring the suit to obtain the injunctive or declaratory relief sought." 6
This objective overlay is meant to prevent "sham requests" that "provide
cover" for (b)(2) actions primarily brought for monetary recovery.167 While
this inquiry may prevent only gross manipulation, its coupling with the effi-
ciency and manageability requirement justify Robinson's survival and Mol-
ski's demise.168
Although the Second Circuit's nod to judicial economy counterbalances
the subjectivity involved in determining plaintiff intent, the Second Circuit
may overreach. Unlike Rule 23(b)(3), 69 Rule 23(b)(2) does not explicitly
include manageability as a certification factor. This is because Rule 23(b)(2)
is premised on cohesiveness and homogeneity of a class that justify certifica-
tion, which are not present for Rule 23(b)(3) classes. To rationalize certifi-
cation of a class bound together solely by predominant common issues and
the class action's superiority for resolving the dispute, Rule 23(b)(3) includes
a manageability factor. Importing this factor into Rule 23(b)(2), however,
may risk raising the (b)(2) certification bar to the point of effectively trans-
forming this provision into (b)(3).
Third, the ad hoc approach promotes civil rights enforcement by pre-
serving one of the most powerful Title VII enforcement mechanisms-the
class action device.17 0 Like the precedents permitting back pay, the Second
Circuit's ad hoc approach supports Title VII's make whole remedial scheme
and deters systemic misconduct.
But a permissive certification standard poses its own challenges. Pres-
ervation of (b)(2) certification for a class seeking monetary damages is a
double-edged sword. For example, critics contend that the confluence of bad
publicity, exorbitant litigation costs, and tremendous risk exerts intolerable
pressure on defendants to settle potentially unmeritorious cases under the
weight of class certification.'7' Some have argued that this concern is mini-
" Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
167 Id.
168 It is not clear whether Molski adopted the Robinson "reasonable plaintiffs" check
given that Molski described the Robinson approach only as "similar," and not identical, to its
own. See Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 950 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003). In Dukes, the Ninth
Circuit implied that Molski did include Robinson's "reasonable plaintiffs" check. See Dukes,
603 F.3d at 617 ("To the extent Molski required the district court to inquire only into the intent
of the plaintiffs and focus primarily on determining whether reasonable plaintiffs would bring
suit to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief even in the absence of a possible monetary recov-
ery . .. it is overruled.").
6' FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
n0 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
"' See, e.g., Daniel F. Piar, The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 2001 BYU L. REv. 305, 343-45 (2001); see also Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978).
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mized in the Dukes case because of Wal-Mart's power, size, and wealth.
However, the fact that a mega-corporation can afford to pay ransom does not
justify its being taken hostage. Rather, the solution to this problem is pro-
vided by Rule 23(f), which allows parties to petition the court of appeals for
an immediate review of the class certification decision, rather than wait until
the end of the litigation to challenge the decision. 17 2 Although the appellate
court is not required to permit immediate review, warding off unfair settle-
ment pressure on defendants is a compelling reason to do so.'7 3 Moreover,
federal courts are more likely to review decisions that grant, rather than
deny, class certification. Federal Courts are also more likely to affirm deni-
als of class certification and reverse grants of class.174 Both of these out-
comes favor corporate defendants.
Finally, critics of the Second Circuit's lenient (b)(2) certification test
also complain of the due process risk created by a mandatory class action
involving monetary damages. 7  Because some class members might have a
substantial financial stake in the litigation, they may prefer not to be bound
by a class judgment, but to bring their own individual lawsuits instead.
Without notice and the right to opt out, however, there is a risk that absent
class members with significant monetary damages will be denied their prop-
erty without due process of law. District court judges have readily addressed
this due process concern with various procedural safeguards. 7 6 Some courts
have imported notice and a right to opt out in mandatory class actions.'77
172 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
1' See, e.g., Tardiff v. Knox Cnty., 365 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2004) ("One reason for review
is a threat of liability so large as to place on the defendant an 'irresistible pressure to settle.')
(citation omitted).
174 See Richard D. Freer, Interlocutory Review of Class Action Certification Decisions: A
Preliminary Empirical Study of Federal and State Experience, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 13, 13, 27
(2007); Brian Anderson, Partner, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Remarks at Federal Trade Com-
mission Panel: Tools for Ensuring That Settlements Are "Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate"
(Sept. 13, 2004), in 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1197, 1211 (2005) (Stating that defendants won
70% of interlocutory appeals over the five year period prior to the panel, and stating that the
most common outcome of cases in those five years was reversal of class certification orders).
' The Second Circuit itself conceded that, unlike the ad hoc test, Allison's "bright-line
prohibition of (b)(2) class treatment for claims seeking non-incidental damages eliminates this
risk." Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 166 (2d Cir. 2001).
176 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 89, at § 2:3 (describing various approaches used for certi-
fying civil rights class actions under Rule 23(b)(2) when plaintiffs seek damages in addition to
injunctive or declaratory relief); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897-99 (7th Cir.
1999) (same); Malveaux, supra note 149, at 415 n.52 (citing cases).
'7 See, e.g., In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 417 (5th Cir. 2004); Eubanks
v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing circuit cases recognizing district court
discretion to permit opt outs in mandatory classes). Wal-Mart's argument that opt outs are not
permitted under Rule 23(b)(2) is, thus, out of step with a number of circuit courts of appeals to
have addressed this issue. The text of Rule 23 also supports courts' power to provide notice
and an opportunity to opt out: "For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the court
may direct appropriate notice to the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A). Additionally, courts
have relied on their discretionary power under Rule 23(d) to provide notice for (b)(2) classes.
Courts may also use their discretion to permit absent class members to opt out of a mandatory
class action. See Robinson, 267 F.3d at 166; Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,
418 n.13 (5th Cir. 1998). Wal-Mart cites Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
811-12 (1985), for the proposition that "[r]esolving monetary claims without providing no-
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Other courts have certified class-wide liability and equitable issues under
(b)(2) and individual damages claims under (b)(3) (i.e., hybrid certification).
And others have certified solely class-wide liability issues under (b)(2), leav-
ing the individual damages claims to be pursued individually. 7 Thus, using
these safeguards, the courts have been able to afford absent class members
due process even when they seek significant damages in mandatory class
actions. The presence of monetary damages-even non-incidental ones-
need not break down the cohesiveness of a class bound by a common injury
and the need for injunctive or declaratory relief. On balance, the ad hoc test
offers more advantages than the incidental one.
3. Objective Effects Test
In Dukes, the Ninth Circuit proffers a new "objective effects test" for
determining whether monetary relief predominates over injunctive or declar-
atory relief under Rule 23(b)(2). Although the Ninth Circuit's approach has
yet to be tested, it purports to build on the strengths and weaknesses of its
predecessors,'79 including its own past approach.'8 0 Like all the other circuits
to have considered the propriety of monetary relief in a (b)(2) class, the
Ninth Circuit correctly anchors its inquiry in whether such relief predomi-
nates by relying on the Advisory Committee note's guidance. Thus, the Al-
lison, Robinson, and Dukes triumvirate ought to have put to bed the question
of whether Rule 23(b)(2)'s silence on the availability of monetary relief
should be resolved by examining the drafters' intent.
Using predominance as its anchoring principle, the Ninth Circuit cre-
ated an objective effects test that balances various competing interests. The
Dukes approach attempts to do this balancing by including non-incidental
damages in (b)(2) classes-contrary to Allison-while retreating from a
plaintiff-centered and subjective analysis-contrary to Robinson and Molski,
respectively."' Dukes comes down the middle, creating a predominance test
that borrows the best from its sister circuits. In its short lifetime, the Ninth
Circuit's predominance test seems to provide the appropriate judicial discre-
tion, protect the due process rights of absent class members, encourage civil
rights enforcement, and promote judicial economy.
tice and opt-out rights to absent class members violates due process." Reply Brief for Peti-
tioner at 20, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 10-277 (Mar. 17, 2011). However, Shutts is
not so broad. Shutts makes clear that its holding applies only to when plaintiffs' claims are
"wholly or predominately for money judgments." 472 U.S. at 811-812 n.3. Thus, Shutts
explicitly does not address monetary judgments for a lesser amount or back pay. See also id.
("We intimate no view concerning other types of class actions, such as those seeking equitable
relief.").
17 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). See also Robinson, 267 F.3d at 167-69 (certifying plain-
tiffs' pattern-or-practice disparate treatment claim for (b)(2) class treatment, even if the reme-
dial stage will ultimately be resolved on a non-class basis).
'" See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 615-17 (9th Cir. 2010).
n See discussion of Molski supra Part III.B.2.
"' Dukes, 603 F.3d at 616-17.
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First, the objective effects test upholds judicial discretion by giving the
district courts ample latitude in determining predominance. Criticizing the
Fifth Circuit's incidental test for "usurp[ing] the district courts' authority
granted by Rule 23," the Ninth Circuit restores the broad discretion neces-
sary for conducting a rigorous class certification analysis.18 2 The objective
effects test does this by not requiring the same kind of nexus between mone-
tary relief and injunctive or declaratory relief that has justified the inclusion
of back pay and other types of equitable monetary relief in a (b)(2) class.
The Ninth Circuit does not require that the monetary relief sought be equita-
ble or incidental. While Dukes provides factors that a district court should
use when determining if monetary relief predominates, none of these are
dispositive and the court may consider other factors it deems relevant."'
This broad discretion, however, does not go unchecked. Dukes em-
braces the objectivity and practicality of the Allison incidental test. Dukes
does this by rejecting the plaintiff-centric and subjective nature of the Robin-
son and Molski tests, respectively, and by introducing its own practical con-
siderations into the predominance inquiry. More specifically, factors
relevant to whether monetary relief predominates involve the impact such
relief will have on the litigation. The relief may impact key procedures,
issues, the potential need for individualized hearings, and manageability.' 4
The district court is tasked with, on a case-by-case basis, determining how
the presence of monetary damages claims will actually play out in the litiga-
tion. While this swing towards objectivity is generally laudable, like the
Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit must be careful that its importation of
manageability considerations does not threaten to transform Rule 23(b)(2) to
(b)(3).
Second, the objective effects test affirmatively recognizes the relevance
of absent class members' due process rights. One of the factors a district
court should consider when determining if monetary relief predominates is if
its "size and nature-as measured by recovery per class member-raise par-
ticular due process . . . concerns."' 8 Furthermore, like cases awarding back
pay, the objective effects test requires that the monetary relief support class
cohesiveness, by not becoming "'superior [in] strength, influence, or au-
thority' to injunctive and declaratory relief."'86 Dukes ensures that monetary
damages do not become superior by considering the practical ways damages
would affect the litigation. Although Dukes introduces new criteria for de-
termining whether monetary relief threatens class cohesiveness, the goal is
the same. Any monetary relief must buttress class solidarity, not endanger
it.
Third, like cases permitting back pay under (b)(2), the Ninth Circuit
objective effects test promotes civil rights enforcement, in general, and Title
" Id. at 616 (citation omitted).
1
8
1 Id. at 621.
* See id at 617.
1 Id. at 617.
186 Id. at 616 (citation omitted).
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VII's broad remedial scheme, in particular. By permitting non-incidental
damages in a (b)(2) class, the objective effects test recognizes Congress's
intent in drafting Title VII to eradicate discrimination and make victims
whole. It also satisfies the Advisory Committee's intent in drafting Rule
23(b)(2) as a vehicle for accomplishing Title VII's objectives."' The class
certification bar is not so high as to preclude potentially meritorious civil
rights cases from being certified when appropriate.' 8
Finally, the objective effects test promotes judicial economy by ena-
bling plaintiffs to proceed collectively when there is group-wide harm that
necessitates group-wide relief. Judges, counsel and the parties get the bene-
fits of aggregate over piecemeal litigation. By incorporating manageability
as one component among many for (b)(2) certification, the Ninth Circuit's
new test encourages the efficiencies collective actions are designed to
provide.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's new predominance test, while in its infancy,
suggests how courts can properly balance important competing interests for
employment discrimination class actions.
C. Comparative Analysis of Predominance Tests
The Allison, Robinson, and Dukes trio offer important insights that may
guide the Supreme Court in its determination of what circumstances justify
inclusion of monetary damages in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action. On balance,
Allison's incidental test poses more problems than solutions. Although the
Fifth Circuit's incidental test is objective and protective of due process
rights, the test's primary flaw is its overly restrictive definition of predomi-
nance. As a result, Allison deprives the district courts of the broad discretion
necessary to conduct a rigorous class certification analysis, deprives victims
of discrimination of one of the most critical civil rights enforcement tools-
the class action-and deprives the civil justice system of the efficiencies of
aggregate litigation.
In contrast, Robinson's ad hoc balancing test does a better job at strik-
ing the right balance. The Second Circuit's ad hoc test respects judicial dis-
cretion, promotes judicial economy, and champions civil rights enforcement.
But this more permissive class certification standard may unfairly pressure
defendants to settle and create due process concerns for absent class mem-
bers. These concerns, however, are alleviated by the potential availability of
' See id. at 616 ("Allison approach is in direct conflict with the text of the Advisory
Committee's Note").
1'8 In fact, the objective effects test may result in greater access to (b)(2) certification. In a
class action brought by employees of a Chinese language newspaper alleging violations of
various California labor laws, the Ninth Circuit upheld a federal district court's (b)(2) certifica-
tion on the grounds that the monetary relief sought was on "equal footing" with the injunctive
relief. So long as the monetary relief did not predominate over the injunctive relief, certifica-
tion was appropriate. See Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 623 F.3d 743, 753-55 (9th Cir.
2010).
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immediate appeal of the certification decision and the availability of numer-
ous procedural protections.
Finally, Dukes' objective effects test, despite its infancy, may have the
most to offer the Supreme Court because of the Ninth Circuit's opportunity
to learn from its sister circuits, and even itself. Dukes attempts to strike the
right balance by including non-incidental damages-contrary to Allison-
while retreating from a plaintiff-centered and subjective analysis-contrary
to Robinson and Molski. While the Ninth Circuit restores the broad discre-
tion necessary for the complex class certification decision, it also limits and
channels such discretion by introducing practical factors that address man-
ageability and due process, thereby promoting judicial economy. Moreover,
like back pay, monetary relief under the objective effects test is justified
because of its importance in eradicating systemic discrimination and making
victims whole. In sum, the most recent predominance test, formulated in
Dukes, may turn out to be the most instructive.
CONCLUSION
The Allison, Robinson, and Dukes circuit split makes it clear that, al-
though there are three distinct approaches for determining the predominance
of monetary damages, there has been only one way of resolving the question
of whether Rule 23(b)(2)'s silence precludes monetary relief altogether. All
of the courts of appeals to have ruled on the issue have relied on the Advi-
sory Committee's guidance, an approach warranted regardless of which pri-
mary school of statutory construction-textualism or intentionalism-is
used. Whether clarifying Rule 23(b)(2)'s ambiguous text or avoiding an ab-
surd outcome that would result from the Rule's unambiguous text, the Court
should consult the Advisory Committee notes to determine the availability
of monetary relief. The notes' unique development and role make them par-
ticularly reliable and worthy of significant deference.
The Advisory Committee notes make clear that the Rule's drafters did
not intend to ban all forms of monetary relief, but only a small subset-
exclusive or predominant monetary damages. Thus, the answer to the ques-
tion of whether claims for monetary relief can be certified under Rule
23(b)(2) is a resounding yes. Wal-Mart's contention that there are no cir-
cumstances under which monetary relief is justified under (b)(2) contradicts
well-established law and conflates the separate approaches courts have used
for permitting back pay, on the one hand, and monetary damages, on the
other.
Because of its equitable nature and susceptibility to common proof,
back pay has long been permitted in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions. As a part-
ner to injunctive and declaratory relief, back pay has played a central role in
eradicating discriminatory practices and making victims whole under Title
VII's broad remedial scheme. Without exception, all of the courts of appeals
to have ruled on the issue have recognized the compatibility of back pay and
Rule 23(b)(2) in the Title VII context.
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In contrast, courts have permitted (b)(2) certification of claims for mon-
etary damages (compensatory and punitive) so long as they are not the ex-
clusive or predominant form of relief sought. Because damages may not
lend themselves to common proof, predominance ensures that the class re-
mains sufficiently cohesive to provide due process, while sufficiently flexi-
ble to provide the efficiency of aggregate litigation. Predominance has been
the linchpin to certification of claims involving monetary damages under
Rule 23(b)(2). Thus, what is at issue is how courts should determine when
damages predominate over injunctive or declaratory relief, not whether they
should be permitted at all.
The predominance tests set forth in the Allison, Robinson, and Dukes
trio may aid the Supreme Court in its determination of what circumstances
justify inclusion of monetary damages in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action. Based
on the principles of judicial discretion, judicial economy, due process, and
civil rights enforcement, a comparative analysis of the three approaches sug-
gests that, although Dukes is youngest of the trio, it may turn out to be the
wisest. Dukes takes the best from its sister circuits by permitting non-inci-
dental damages-contrary to Allison-while retreating from a plaintiff-cen-
tered and subjective analysis-contrary to Robinson and Molski. The Ninth
Circuit resurrects the broad judicial discretion required by a rigorous class
certification analysis, and yet introduces practical factors that address man-
ageability and due process concerns, thereby advancing judicial economy.
Finally, the Dukes test offers promise, as contemplated by the Advisory
Committee and Title VII's drafters, that Rule 23(b)(2) will continue to aid
those fighting to rid society of systemic discrimination and repair those rav-
aged by its consequences.
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